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A. ORIGIN OF THE MODEL
Throughout history progress in the art of warfare has
evolved through the development of new weapons and equipment
(technology) , and the selected method by which to employ them:
the war fighting concept (doctrine) . Ideally, doctrinal
development is pursued in a manner which takes advantage of
new or emerging technologies. Current era technological
acceleration can create problems for those who decide on
military organizations and doctrine, particularly when new
"products" are presented and finding the "means to employ
them" becomes the overriding factor in doctrinal development.
The U.S. Army, recognizing that a warfighting concept and
technology must interact harmoniously to maximize military
potential, developed the Concept Based Requirements System
(CBRS) . This system emphasizes that a robust warfighting
concept, developed considering future technologies and
military resources, should set requirements for Army training,
organizational structure, and acquired weapon systems. A
robust concept is one which efficiently achieves campaign
success over a wide range of scenario types.
The "Future Warfighting Concepts and Technologies" project
is sponsored by the Army as part of the Applied Technology
Program at Rand Corporation's Arroyo Center. The design of
this project is to develop improved methods for finding
appropriate warfighting concepts and methods for forecasting
the technical capacities of future weapon systems.
One of the products of this project is a warfighting
concept screening tool called MOSCOW (Method of Screening
Concepts of Operational Warfare) . The intended purpose of
MOSCOW is to perform inexpensive "first cut" concept
screening. This tool is designed to quantitatively assess the
effectiveness of a warfighting concept using relevant measures
of effectiveness (MOE) . Some MOSCOW MOE include number of
friendly units required to win the campaign, personnel
casualty figures, supplies consumed, and time enemy takes to
penetrate given distances into the friendly zone. Because it
is easy to use, MOSCOW can quickly generate measures to
compare a large number of concepts over a wide range of
scenarios with few resources. Potentially viable concepts
that appear robust during MOSCOW analysis may then be selected
for more exhaustive (and expensive) testing by other methods.
B. MODEL STRUCTURE
Moscow is a spreadsheet based (Lotus 1-2-3) , low
resolution combat model [Ref. l:pp. 1-5]. It employs a
Lanchester square law attrition module and emphasizes a cycle
of activities for each unit between engagement events. The
activity cycle represents the model author's premise that
actual engagements form only a portion of a campaign fighting
process. Military forces engage in battles, but must undergo
other activities between battles to sustain themselves
throughout a campaign. The model is unique in its
prescriptive approach. Conventional combat models determine
the results of battles or the amount of "success" achievable
based upon a set of inputs which describe the characteristics
of opposing forces, and the conditions under which battle is
joined. Moscow uses these inputs to determine the number of
friendly maneuver units and resources required to achieve the
required friendly force success conditions. Moscow inputs are
organized into six categories.
1. Terrain Features.
2. Campaign Zone and Red Threat Scenario.
3. Blue Success Criteria and Threaten Level Policy.




6. Proportional Constraints on Maneuver Unit Activities.
A substantial set of measures of effectiveness (MOE) is output
for comparison between model runs. MOE comparisons form the
basis for analysts to rank order potential warfighting
concepts.
Moscow determines how a warfighting concept affects the
results of a campaign, where large numbers of maneuver forces
engage in numerous battles for some period of time. Each
opposing force may assign subordinate maneuver units attack
and defend missions. Both attack and defend units spend time
and exhaust resources passing through a cycle of activities
between engagement events. The use of the activity cycle is
intended to represent those intermediate processes, rest,
repair, load supplies, etc. that a force must perform to
sustain the ability to successfully engage in campaign
attrition battles. The time spent in each activity between
each battle is determined by the set of inputs which describes
basic maneuver unit capabilities and the concept of
warfighting under evaluation. A campaign consists of the
number of cycles required to achieve input success conditions.
Therefore the total time spent in each activity during the
course of a campaign forms a distribution of activity times
reported by MOSCOW.
Warfighting concepts can be compared based upon their
relative efficiency in terms of numbers of maneuver units and
resources required to obtain friendly campaign success. Each
activity in the cycle consumes resources at some specified
rate. Therefore a concept analyst can use the distribution
of activity times to learn how competing warfighting concepts
achieve success. Concepts may then be modified to achieve
success in a manner acceptable to decision makers.
C. THESIS OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research is to provide information
that will allow intelligent calibration coefficient selection
by potential users of MOSCOW. The required information is
not provided by the model's existing documentation. The
objective is achieved by performing analysis of the model's
use of calibration coefficients. The result is a document to
which users may refer to obtain information for choosing
specific values for each coefficient and the potential effect
it may have on model results.
D. THESIS SCOPE
Analysis is oriented on one category of MOSCOW'S input
section: calibration coefficients. Users should refer to
References 1-4 for additional information about the MOSCOW
model. The methodology used during analysis is described in
Chapter III. It includes a verification of the model code
pertaining to calibration coefficients. Code corrections were
made as required to ensure that combat processes are
represented as intended by the model's author or to enhance
realism. The use of each calibration coefficient is explained
to prompt considerations which should be made when selecting
their value. A recommended range from which to select
specific values is listed for each coefficient. The
sensitivity of selected model outputs to calibration
coefficient value changes within the recommended range is
determined by a factorial experimental design.
II. ANALYSIS MOTIVATION
A. PREVIOUS WORK PERFORMED ON MOSCOW
References 1 and 2 were published by Rand Corporation to
assist users of the Moscow model. The first publication
provides extensive theoretical background on the model's
development. It establishes the model's intended purpose as
a warfighting concept screening tool within the context of
CBRS . The document is a detailed account of the model
structure. Examples are included which emphasize how MOSCOW
can represent various warfighting concepts. It also includes
an organized explanation of MOSCOW'S strengths and weaknesses
for representing different attributes of the combat process.
Reference 1 also clearly explains MOSCOW'S cycle of activity
approach and devotes an appendix to describe the Lanchester
attrition module.
The six input categories described earlier are addressed
by both Rand publications. Many individual inputs are
addressed in detail to guide potential model users. However,
large input sections are addressed only as a group, without
explaining considerations for selecting individual values.
Reference 2 is actually an embellishment of the inputs
description section of Reference 1. Almost all of the inputs
are addressed by a short sentence to clarify their definition.
However two of the input categories are not addressed in
enough detail to make intelligent input value selections.
The first category requiring additional guidance is that
of "Maneuver Unit Description." This section includes all of
the information concerning the capability attributes for both
Red and Blue forces. This category also includes most of the
inputs which describe the "concept" or warfighting style to
be represented during model execution. Model users are not
given enough information to understand how many of these
inputs are used in the model. Without this information a user
must make assumptions about the use of the inputs. When the
assumptions prove incorrect, the result is that the actual
"concept" intended for evaluation is not the one represented
in the model. The consequences of this lack of information
are misleading results and poor analysis.
Hoffman, recognizing the need for additional guidance,
wrote a technical memorandum providing one methodology for the
selection of MOSCOW inputs in categories two, three, and four
[Ref. 3]. It explains one method for selecting a set of
inputs which will reflect the desired "concept" of interest.
Hoffman also directed his thesis effort towards identifying
the fundamental assumptions upon which MOSCOW is based [Ref.
4]. The work contains extensive analysis of the model output
sensitivity to changes in these inputs from base case
examples.
Thorough study of the Rand publications and Hoffman's work
provides MOSCOW users a foundation adequate to begin using the
model with the exception of the calibration coefficient input
category. This thesis is an effort to provide the remaining
required information to perform intelligent input selection
to properly use MOSCOW as an analysis tool.
B. THE NEED FOR CALIBRATION COEFFICIENT ANALYSIS
As with any new model there is little real user experience
from which to learn MOSCOW'S proper use or become aware of
inherent shortcomings. The model is an analysis tool. The
quality of any analysis using model results depends directly
upon how well the model represents the actual behavior of the
system under study. The analysis of calibration coefficient
use in MOSCOW supports the following three factors which
influence how well a model represents the system of interest:
1. Verification and validation processes are designed to
ensure a model performs as intended by its originator.
These processes include a wide range of tasks from
simple code debugging to more complex issues such as
ensuring that the model's level of resolution is
appropriate for the modelled phenomenon.
2. The model must be used for its intended purpose. A
highly aggregated model focusing on force sustainability
should not be used to analyze the effects of some new
weapon system on the result of a high resolution battle.
Proper use is ensured by thoroughly understanding a
model's internal processes and the discipline to apply
it only to systems adequately represented. Ignorance
of a model's internal processes can easily lead to
misapplication.
3. The set of model inputs must accurately reflect the
state of all elements of interest in the system
represented. This includes simple notions such as
firing rates, to more complex input sets that describe
the "operational warfighting style" of the force.
MOSCOW employs nine mandatory and 20 optional calibration
coefficients. A few of these coefficients are addressed
individually throughout Rand Reference 1. For the remainder,
users can rely only upon a few paragraphs describing the
purpose of this input set. These coefficients are
predominantly used to affect the degree to which other inputs
affect some intermediate model process. These intermediate
processes include the times determined for several activities,
the lethality and vulnerability of forces, frontage used
during engagements, the effects of rest on mobility, and many
others.
Consider having the following information with which to
select the value of some calibration coefficient. The input
name is IERRCOEFSURVTM. It affects the time of the survey and
reconnaissance activity and subsequently the total cycle time
between engagements. The other input involved is percent
intelligence error with the relationship (1 + INTELLIGENCE
ERROR) A IERRCOEFSURVTM. A previous example used a value of
-100.00 for this coefficient.
Questions immediately arise concerning the considerations
when selecting a value for IERRCOEFSURVTM. How sensitive is
the time of the activity to this input? Can the input be
positive? What does the complete time of activity equation
look like, and are the units minutes, hours, or days?
As it turns out, analyzing the use of IERRCOEFSURVTM
reveals important information. The actual equation for each
cycle's time for the survey and reconnaissance activity is:
TIME SURVEY & RECON [DAYS] = (1 + X INTELLIGENCE ERROR) IERRCOEFSURVTM
This activity represents the time to locate the opposing
force between engagement events. Friendly intelligence error
is a small value between zero and one, probably around .10.
A plot of this function in Figure 1 demonstrates that using
a negative calibration coefficient results in an unreasonable
"trend." As a unit's intelligence error increases the time
to locate the opposing force decreases. Common sense
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Figure 1. Example of Improper Trend in An Activity Due
to Poor Calibration Coefficient Selection.
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indicates this trend should be reversed. Using a positive
calibration coefficient indicates that the minimum time to
locate the opposing force between engagements is one day.
This does not appear to be very flexible and unreasonable for
many circumstances. Obviously there is a problem with the
argument (1 + % intelligence error) since neither a positive
or negative value for IERRCOEFSURVTM appears satisfactory.
If we change the equation to:
TIME SURVEY & RECON [DAYS] = 1 - (1-% INTELLIGENCE ERROR) IERRCOEFSURV™
and replot it in Figure 2, the "trend" becomes reasonable for
positive values of IERRCOEFSURVTM. As intelligence error
increases, the time to locate the opposing force also
increases. The sensitivity of the activity time to the
percent intelligence error is determined by the magnitude of
the IERRCOEFSURVTM coefficient. In this case a value of one
implies a direct, linear relationship between intelligence
error percentage and the time to locate the enemy. A
coefficient greater than one implies a stronger effect while
a value between zero and one implies a weaker effect of %
intelligence error at the activity time. Note that the
calibration coefficient must be greater than or equal to zero
or an unreasonable negative activity time will result.
The analysis of this coefficient answered each question
raised by the inadequate pre-analysis information. In
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Figure 2 . corrected Relationship Between intelligence
Error, Coefficient L690, and Time of Survey and
Reconnaissance Activity.
of the analysis. An improper "trend" was corrected to meet
our expectation that an increase in intelligence error should
lead to an increase in the time of the survey and
reconnaissance activity. The information provided by the
analysis should enable a model user to select an appropriate
value for the calibration coefficient IERRCOEFSURVTM. The
degree of sensitivity of the activity time may now be selected
according to the user's needs.
The methodology used to perform similar analysis of the
entire set of calibration coefficients is discussed in the
next chapter. MOSCOW documentation does not provide enough
12
information for a user to simply determine this information
in a timely fashion. Each coefficient generally affects two
to eight or more equations in various locations in the
spreadsheet code. Graphical analysis of these equations is
the only efficient way to detect improper trends such as that
just discovered in the aforementioned example. In other cases
the influence of a coefficient on a modelled process is more
complicated and typically involves analyzing several
subsequent modules of the spreadsheet to determine its effect.
By performing this analysis, making corrections as required,
and documenting the results, model users will have a ready
reference for intelligently selecting appropriate values for
this set of inputs. A by-product of the analysis is that a
number of intermediate processes in the model more accurately




The methodology used during calibration coefficient
analysis is divided into six steps. The procedures are
intended to form a systematic framework from which consistent
analysis may be completed for all 29 coefficients. MOSCOW'S
code is not well documented to facilitate verification
analysis by virtue of its spreadsheet format. However, the
model author constructed the spreadsheet in a well organized
fashion. The spreadsheet is divided into eight "screen wide"
columns called modules. Each module is partitioned by
subsections called tables, each pertaining to some particular
process or related topic. Executing the analysis is therefore
a tedious, but manageable task. Each step of the methodology
is explained below using an example calibration coefficient.
Information determined by this methodology is summarized
for each calibration coefficient in Appendix B. Appendix B
is perhaps the most important part of this work. It contains
the information MOSCOW users should consult when selecting
calibration coefficient values.
Coefficient names used in this document are the same as
used in MOSCOW to provide easy cross reference to the model.
The calibration coefficient used to illustrate the methodology
procedural steps is named DISMTDLETHCOEF. This calibration
14
coefficient modifies force lethality as a function of the
percentage of infantry that is conducting dismounted
operations. MOSCOW explicitly models only one "average" type
of combat vehicle and its corresponding "average 1 " weapon
system. However, the model employs techniques which attempt
to capture various combat sub-processes. In this case a
lethality modification exists to capture the effect of
employing different levels of dismounted infantry.
B. PROCEDURAL STEPS USED DURING ANALYSIS
1. Determine Where the Coefficient is Used in the Model
The model spreadsheet is searched to determine each
line of code using the calibration coefficient. This step is
performed by using a printout of all spreadsheet cell
formulas, and manually searching each line of code.
For example, documentation indicates that
DISMTDLETHCOEF is used to modify force lethality. A search
finds that the coefficient is used in two tables (LETHALITY
CALCULATIONS C.5 AND C.6) within the Intermediate Calculations
module in a total of twelve cell formulas. The spreadsheet
is checked in its entirety to ensure these are the only
formulas which employ this coefficient.
1MOSCOW requires the user to aggregate all modelled
weapon systems into an "average" weapon system since the
attrition module is based upon homogeneous Lanchester square
law equations. Model users are left to determine their own
aggregation methods. Reference 3 is devoted solely to one
methodology for aggregating unit weapon systems.
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2. Determine the Sub-process Affected By the Coefficient
Each calibration coefficient affects some specific
process represented in the model. The total combination of
all sub-processes forms MOSCOW'S representation of the larger
Campaign process. The terms process and sub-process are used
interchangeably in this paper when referring to the smaller
process which combine to form the Campaign process.
Contextual use will clarify the term's intended meaning. Some
of these processes include activity times, mobility,
lethality, maneuver frontage, vulnerability, and security
force reguirements. Studying the tables where each
coefficient is used provides information about how MOSCOW
models a particular process.
The tables which use DISMTDLETHCOEF compute the
Lanchester lethality coefficients subseguently used by the
attrition module for attack and defend engagements. In these
tables, other inputs are used to determine the following
initial "naive" estimates for both Red and Blue lethality.
HITS 1 = SHOTS x P H1T (on enemy vehicles) (1)
MIN MIN SHOT
KILLS 1 = HITS 1 x P
KILL
(on enemy vehicles) (2)
MIN MIN HIT
PHITS 1 = HITS 1 x (ANTI-PERSCOEF) (kills on enemy personnel) (3)
MIN MIN
where anti-personnel coefficient is an input used to determine
the number of personnel kills per vehicle kill.
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These "first iteration" estimates (signified by the
number 1 used in the equation) are modified three times based
upon such influences as terrain, target availability, amount
of rest, and command, control and communications (C3) error.
After these three modification steps the result [KILLS
4/MINUTE] is used in the Lanchester attrition module. [HITS
4/MINUTE] values are used to generate dismounted personnel
losses.
DISMTDLETHCOEF is used in the last modification step
as follows:
HITS U = HTTS 3 x (% Personnel Dismounted)DISMTDLETHC0EF (4)
MI M MIN
KILLS 4 = KILLS 3 x (% Personnel Dismounted)DISMTDLETHC0EF (5)
MIN MIN
PHITS 3 = PHITS 3 x (% Personnel Dismounted)DISMTDLETHC0EF (6)
MIN MIN
There are corresponding equations for Red and Blue forces in
both attack and defend activity tables for a total of twelve
cell formulas using this coefficient.
3 . Study Process Relationships
Steps one and two provide the information necessary
to study the effect of the coefficient on the process
involved. The form of cell formulas, and their subsequent
use, define these effects. Analysis at this level verifies
that MOSCOW code matches intuition and the author's intent
concerning process conduct. This step provides the
17
information necessary to establish reasonable ranges for
calibration coefficient values.
The process involved for the example is the effect of
dismounted infantry on force lethality. The idea is that a
force has some inherent lethality prior to dismounting some
portion of its infantry [Ref. 1]. This lethality will
increase by some amount as more infantry is dismounted since
more firers will increase the force kill rate. The degree to
which dismounted infantry modifies the kill rate is determined
by the calibration coefficient DISMTDLETHCOEF. Figure 3 is
a surface plot of the force kill rate (Eguation 5 above) for
different levels of percent infantry dismounted and the
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Figure 3. Improper Modification of Force Kill Rate Due
to Dismounted Infantry.
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coefficient DISMTDLETHCOEF. The pre-dismounted infantry kill
rate is set at 100 kills/minute in the figure for purposes of
example. The figure shows that Equation (5) does not model
this process as the author intended. The force kill rate
before considering dismounted infantry is 100 kills/minute.
Equation (5) actually reduces this kill rate by some fraction
corresponding to the percentage of dismounted infantry. Only
if all infantry is dismounted is force lethality maintained
at 100 kills/minute. Since the kill rate increases as
dismounted infantry increases, the trend is appropriate, but
it should increase from 100 kills/minute, not zero.
If a negative value for DISMTDLETHCOEF is used the
trend would inappropriately reverse. Unreasonably high
increases in the kill rate would occur at small percentages
of dismounted infantry, while full dismounting would leave the
kill rate unchanged. Obviously Equation (5) requires
modification to reflect the authors intent and intuitive
belief about this process.
A feasible modification of Equation (5) is:
KILLS 4 = KILLS 3 x ( 1 + % Personnel Dismounted)DISMTDLETHC0EF (7)
MIN MIN
which is plotted in Figure 4. This simple code correction
retains the appropriate trend and increases the pre-existing
kill rate as infantry dismounts. The degree to which
dismounted infantry increases force lethality depends upon the











Figure 4. Corrected Relationship Between Dismounted
Infantry and Force Kill Rate.
Many equations using calibration coefficients required
modifications in order to correct improper trends or other
problems. When modifications to MOSCOW were required a
feasible alternative was recoded into the model. A list of
code corrections appears in Appendix C. The recoding was
performed so that subsequent sensitivity analysis was not
rendered invalid by processes which were obviously
misrepresented. More value is realized by correcting
deficiencies than simply reporting their existence. The
20
modified version of this model, labeled MOSCOW-NPS, was used
during sensitivity analysis.
4. Determine the Calibration Coefficient Value Range
Information gathered in previous steps is used to
determine the set of values from which model users should
select specific calibration coefficient values. Effort to
this point has been preliminary to ensure that the effect of
the calibration coefficient on some specific process is well
understood and corrected if necessary to meet intuitive
trends. In this step the value range consists only of those
calibration coefficient values which return reasonable sub-
process results. The word reasonable is used because there
is no formula or recipe for establishing decision rules to
select the range. There are many combat sub-processes which
the model attempts to capture. Sub-process results vary in
actual combat just as different input values render various
sub-process results in the model. The intent is to establish
a set of calibration coefficient value ranges for which the
model will return sub-process results that are within
reasonable bounds one may expect in a campaign. For example,
MOSCOW models the degrading effects due to lack of rest. Two
inputs, BASELINE % REST, and % REST combine to determine the
fraction of reguired rest units get in the campaign. Lack of
rest slows unit movement and lethality. The value selected
for the calibration coefficient LOWRESTCOEF determines the
degree by which movement and lethality are degraded by the
21
lack of rest. This analysis shows that LOWRESTCOEF values
much greater than five can reduce movement and lethality to
almost zero, even when units get most of the required rest.
Certainly lack of rest has degrading effects, but when a model
user selects large values for this coefficient this effect is
severely overemphasized.
One cannot place much confidence in a model which
grossly misrepresents fundamental combat sub-processes. The
idea is that more confidence will be placed in the results of
a model which reasonably represents fundamental combat
processes.
The plots produced in step three are evaluated using
reasonableness as the decision rule to select calibration
coefficient value ranges. For example, Figure 4 is used to
determine which values for DISMTDLETHCOEF return a reasonable
modification of force kill rate by dismounting infantry. When
no infantry is dismounted the previous kill rate should remain
the same. A value of zero for DISMTDLETHCOEF in Figure 4
fulfills this requirement. The value zero becomes the lower
bound for DISMTDLETHCOEF 1 s range of values. Note that
whenever zero is used for this coefficient the user is
implicitly assuming that dismounted infantry has no effect on
the force kill rate.
The question is, considering campaign averages, how
much can a force commander expect to increase his average kill
rate when dismounting infantry? In reality, higher level
22
commanders perform no such analysis. The reality is that
dismounted infantry and platform mounted weapons are
complimentary resources. The amount of dismounted infantry
and its relative lethality fluctuate in response to ever
changing small unit situations. The decision to dismount is
made at the small unit level only when and where the situation
makes this tactic relatively advantageous. Therefore campaign
success may more appropriately depend upon the availability
of dismounted infantry in many small unit situations
throughout the campaign.
Since low resolution models such as MOSCOW do not
capture evolving small unit situations, one must resort to
"average effects." When forced to quantify such an ambiguous
average it is reasonable to expect that a combat force, on
average, would at most double its lethality by dismounting
infantry. Therefore, doubling the force kill rate is selected
as an optimistic upper bound. Using Figure 4, this implies
a corresponding upper bound of one for DISMTDLETHCOEF ' s value
range. The actual DISMTDLETHCOEF value for most campaign
scenarios should be between zero and one.
5. Conduct Sensitivity Analysis
Once calibration coefficient reasonable ranges are
determined, the next question becomes "What is the effect of
choosing particular calibration coefficient values on model
results?" The calibration coefficient value ranges were
determined based on a reasonableness rule of thumb pertaining
23
to corresponding process results. The purpose of this step
is to determine how sensitive MOSCOW'S overall MOE are to
changes in calibration coefficient values. The MOE results
are determined by the manner in which the model represents the
cumulative effect of a full set of inputs. These MOE are used
to compare and rank alternative "concepts" over a range of
scenarios to determine which are promising enough to continue
analysis by more exhaustive methods. It is important to
determine if MOE results are overly dependent upon particular
model inputs. Work by Hoffman examined this dependence in
detail for most MOSCOW inputs, but did not include calibration
coefficients [Ref. 3].
An assumption made about the overall combat process,
is that, given some state of equilibrium in combat, a small
change in sub-process states or entity attributes should not
elicit large changes in combat outcomes. Considering the
enormous number of sub-processes which comprise the overall
combat process, this assumption is intuitively appealing.
Therefore, combat model results, in general, should not be
overly sensitive or dependent on any particular sub-process.
Conversely, model results should not be totally insensitive
to change in these sub-processes. If either case occurs, the
model may not accurately reflect the manner in which actual
combat sub-processes combine to determine actual results. The
complexity involved in validating MOSCOW'S ability to
represent actual combat results is beyond the scope of this
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paper. Such analysis should be performed by a team of
analysts possessing a broader knowledge and access to other
combat models and historical data. This paper essentially
reports the sensitivity of MOSCOW MOE to changes in
calibration coefficient value ranges determined in step 4.
A 2 k Factorial experiment is the method used to
perform the sensitivity analysis. The method was selected
because it has important advantages over a "one variable at
a time" approach. This factorial method requires a model run
for two different values (levels) for each of "K" calibration
coefficients (factors). These 2 k model runs are required to
record MOE values for each combination of the "K" calibration
coefficient's two levels. The "main effect" of a calibration
coefficient on an MOE is the difference between the average
MOE value for all runs when the calibration coefficient is at
"high" level, and the average for the MOE value for all runs
when the calibration coefficient is at a "low" level. The
principle advantage of this method is that the "effect"
determined for a calibration coefficient includes the
influence of the K-l other calibration coefficients being
allowed to vary between their two levels simultaneously. The
validity of the "one variable at a time" method is based upon
the assumption that a factor's effect will not change when
other factors vary. Another factorial design advantage is
that any non-additive calibration coefficient effects, called
interaction effects, are also calculated using this method.
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A "one variable at a time" method requires an assumption that
interaction between factors has no effect on results.
Sensitivity analysis is conducted on 24 of the 29
calibration coefficients. Some coefficients were not included
in the analysis when doing so failed to make sense. For
example, for reasons detailed elsewhere, recommendations are
made to fix the value for two coefficients at a single level.
Therefore, these were not included in the sensitivity
analysis. The reason for excluding these coefficients is
explained in a later section which details the results of this
methodology for each calibration coefficient.
For K=24 coefficients, the 2 k design still requires a
prohibitive number of model runs (in excess of 16 million) to
include all coefficients in one experiment. Therefore the 24
coefficients were partitioned into five sets of eight
coefficients for a total of five experiments. These five sets
were selected on the basis of grouping combinations of inputs
that appear to have the highest likelihood of interaction.
Using this procedure five experiments, each containing 256




A. RECOMMENDED CALIBRATION COEFFICIENT VALUES
The primary benefit of this analysis is information
pertaining to MOSCOW'S use of each calibration coefficient.
This information is detailed in Appendix B. The appendix
should be used by model users already familiar with MOSCOW.
The information presented in this appendix explains how each
calibration coefficient is used by MOSCOW and provides a
recommended value range when selecting calibration coefficient
inputs. Users may find that their requirements lead to
selecting calibration coefficient values outside the ranges
listed in Appendix B. The recommended value ranges are based
on the analysis performed and this author's opinion about
which values return reasonably modelled sub-processes. For
this reason, Appendix A provides a summarized list of
calibration coefficient values with a "feasible" range (the
valid input range for the coefficient within the MOSCOW
program) , a "likely range" (those coefficient values
recommended in Appendix B)
,
and a list of the coefficient
values used in sensitivity analysis.
The calibration coefficient information in Appendix B
applies to a modified version of RAND's MOSCOW-MI, called
MOSCOW-NPS. MOSCOW-NPS contains code corrections made
necessary when code verification analysis revealed problems
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in MOSCOW-MI. The code corrections upon which MOSCOW-NPS is
based are listed in Appendix C. This listing is by
spreadsheet cell reference in LOTUS code format. Interested
model users can identify and compare MOSCOW-MI and MOSCOW-NPS
differences using this information.
B. MOSCOW-MI HAS A POORLY DESIGNED ENGAGEMENT TERMINATION
PROCESS
Combat models reguire engagement termination rules to
determine when battles end. MOSCOW-MI employs an
oversimplified battle termination rule which does not
represent typical engagement logic and can yield improper
engagement results. The weakness in the battle termination
rule was discovered while researching MOSCOW'S attrition
module. The focus of this paper is to provide information
about MOSCOW calibration coefficients, and part of the
analysis methodology includes sensitivity analysis to
determine the effect that different calibration coefficient
values have on MOSCOW measures of effectiveness. This author
believes that it is necessary to correct the battle
termination problem rather than perform sensitivity analysis
on model output which could be in error. The following
paragraphs explain Lanchester combat model engagement
termination rules and contrast battle termination in MOSCOW-
NPS and MOSCOW-MI.
Engagements, whether scaled at small unit or theater
levels, typically end when either side, given the ability to
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disengage, receives an "intolerable" level of attrition. The
"intolerable" level depends upon many factors, but can be
established by two general considerations; the criticality of
the immediate engagement's objective, and the ability to
achieve the objective given the relative capacity of both
forces at any point during the battle. Taylor presents a
thorough analysis of battle termination alternatives, the most
intuitive of which is based upon the Breakpoint Hypothesis
[Ref. 5]. The corrections made to MOSCOW-MI to develop
MOSCOW-NPS follow this hypothesis.
BREAKPOINT HYPOTHESIS: A unit will cease to be an
effective fighting force in a fire fight when a given
force level is reached. When this happens, the unit loses
its ability to perform its mission and will "break off"
the engagement. This force-level breakpoint depends upon
the unit's type, size, and mission. [Ref. 5:p. 238]
Using the breakpoint hypothesis, both attack and defend
forces have some breakpoint at which they will disengage,
ending the battle.
The following variable definitions help explain the battle
termination rules used in the MOSCOW model. This explanation
is in the context of a Blue (X) force attacking a Red (Y)
defender. A symmetrical relationship holds in the case where
Red attacks Blue. Let:
1. X = Initial number of Blue (attack) units.
2. Y = Initial number of Red (defend) units.




Y BP = Number of Blue and Red units surviving at the end
of the battle.
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5. TBP = Time of the engagement;
6. a = Rate at which one Red unit kills Blue units.
7. b = Rate at which one Blue unit kills Red units.
8. DISENGAGE% = A value between zero and one which
represents the ability of Blue to control the
disengagement
.
The Square law winning condition for the X force is:
v /a f 1-(Y I1P/Y )
2
}
Normally this condition is tested to determine which force
"wins" the battle, and the time of battle is computed using
the appropriate Lanchester time equation. If X fails the win
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If X passes the win condition test the Y forces reaches
breakpoint first and the time of the battle is:
r v fy 2 \- 2 4. Jlv 2 i
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An equivalent alternative is to compute both TXBP and TYBP ,
the minimum of which defines the battle outcome. For example,
if TXBP is the minimum time the X force "loses" the battle by
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reaching its breakpoint level before the Y force. The larger
of the two times has no meaning because the battle ends at the
shorter time period.
The number of surviving units for each side is computed
using the minimum breakpoint time in the following Lanchester
force level as a function of time equations:
X(TBP) = \ \{Xo-yJfYo)e y/
* Tw
+(Xo + yJf YV^M (11)
Y(TBP)= ±l(Y -^X oy^T»+(Y + yf±Xoy-^T»\ (12)
where the "losing" force's survivors will correspond to its
breakpoint level. Note that both surviving force levels are
determined using the same breakpoint time since this is when
the battle ends.
MOSCOW-NPS follows the breakpoint method for battle
termination just described with two additional considerations.
First, the breakpoint level for each force depends upon their
ability to disengage from the enemy. The input DISENGAGE%,
a value between zero and one, defines the Blue force's ability
to control when disengagement occurs. This input modifies
each side's desired breakpoint to establish the actual
breakpoints used in the above Lanchester equations. Secondly,
the engagement initial force strengths, X and Y
,
are not
explicitly input by the user. Both versions of MOSCOW follow
31
a convention that a single defending unit is attacked by the
number of attacking units which meet the user input
Attack/Defend Combat Power ratio. Using X as the attacking
force, this Combat Power (CP) ratio is:






Using MOSCOW'S convention, Y is always one, and X is
determined by:
X = CP*(a/b) 1/2 , (14)






Therefore, when using MOSCOW-NPS, engagement victory
conditions are determined by relative force breakpoints and
the Combat Power input.
RAND's version of the model, MOSCOW-MI, uses an
abbreviated version of the battle termination rules just
described for MOSCOW-NPS. There is only one time of battle
equation, the time to the defender's breakpoint, used in
MOSCOW-MI. The RAND version relies on a bold assumption that
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the attacker will always continue to attack until a designated
amount of attrition is achieved on the defender [Ref. l:p.
155]. Battle termination is declared only when the defender
is attrited to some designated fraction of its initial
strength. Under this assumption the attacker continues to
fight regardless of the attacker's own level of attrition.
The attacking force, in MOSCOW-MI, will fight to self-
annihilation if a set of inputs is such that the attacker
lacks sufficient combat power to win the engagement. Using
X as the attacking force, the time of battle equation in
MOSCOW-MI is always:
1 f
ybp~ \/l YBP~ Yo+ a X o I 1
Tybp
-
"TT" 10 ) 7T f (16)Vab I y /_b_ Y J
where TYBP is the time to reach the Y force (defender)
breakpoint. Note the important difference between the TYBP for
MOSCOW-NPS, Equation (12), and this TYBP . The sum of the time
equation terms [Y BP - Y^ + (b/a) (X*) ] for both equations will
be negative when an X force attacker lacks the combat power
to achieve the specified attrition level on the defender.
These terms are within a radical operator in Equation (10),
and when they sum to a negative value the complex root
solution indicates that the attacking force size reaches zero
before the defender is attrited to the specified level. The
attacking force cannot win such a battle and the time of this
type of engagement is defined as infinite.
33
In MOSCOW-MI the absolute value of the sum of these terms
is applied before applying the radical operator, which then
yields a time solution which is "declared" to be the time the
attacker takes to obtain the specified attrition on the
defender. When the attacker lacks sufficient combat power,
the use of the absolute value operator allows the time
equation to report a finite time for attacker success, but the
attacker actually cannot win the battle. Then, Equations (11
and 12) use the "declared" time of battle to find the number
of forces surviving.
The following three figures graphically demonstrate the
differences in battle termination results between the two
models. They show the engagement results of an X force
attacking a Y force at several different attacker/defender
Combat Power ratios using the following example data:
1. Initial defender force strength, Yo = 1 unit, by MOSCOW
convention.
2. Defender breakpoint, Y BP = .60.
3. Initial attacker force strength, Xo = Determined by the
Combat Power ratio shown on the horizontal axis.
4. Attacker breakpoint, X
BP
=
, since MOSCOW-MI always
requires this condition. MOSCOW-NPS allows X to select
other breakpoints.
5. Force lethality coefficients, a = b = 1 ; each force has
same lethality, so combat power, in this example, is
determined purely on the basis of initial force size.
The X force winning condition, from Equation (15) is then:
CP > [1 - (.60) 2 ]- 5 = .80 . (17)
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This means that the X force will "win," (the Y force reaches
breakpoint first) , when X attacks at Combat Power ratios
greater than .80. When X attacks at Combat Power ratios of
.80 or below, X reaches its breakpoint (in this case
annihilation) before Y is reduced to sixty percent of its
original strength.
Figure 5 compares the engagement times computed by each
model for various Combat Power ratios. Note that when this
ratio exceeds .80 the two models agree on engagement time.
Both models operate in an identical fashion as long as the
attacking force has enough combat power to "win" the battle
according to the breakpoint hypothesis and compute engagement
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Figure 5. Engagement Time Differences
Between MOSCOW Model Versions.
For Combat Power ratios below .80 (Equation 13) the two models
provide different results. The engagement times computed by
MOSCOW-NPS are according to the Lanchester square law and the
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breakpoint hypothesis. For these smaller combat power ratios
MOSCOW-NPS uses the time to the attacker's breakpoint
equation, TXBP . The MOSCOW-MI times, however, are still based
upon the time equation for the defender's breakpoint, TYBP .
The normal form of this equation does not have real root
solutions since the terms under the radical operator sum to
a negative value, but MOSCOW-MI ' s improper use of the absolute
operator allows the equation to "claim" time solutions when,
in fact, they are in error.
Figures 6 and 7 show the differences between model results
for the levels of attack and defend force survivors. The
equations computing these levels are identical for both
models, but rely on the computed engagement times. The
differences observed in survivor strength are caused by the
engagement time differences explained earlier. Note that in
both Figures 6 and 7, for Combat Power ratios greater than .80
(when the attacker "wins") , the models agree on survivor
strength for both forces. For smaller Combat Power ratios the
attacking force is annihilated before the defender reaches its
breakpoint. MOSCOW-NPS reflects this known effect in Figure
6 since the attacker's survivor level is zero for all ratios
below .80. In the same figure, MOSCOW-MI shows that the
further the attacker's Combat Power ratio falls below .80, the
greater the number of surviving attack forces, which is an
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Figure 7. Defending Force Survivor
Differences Between MOSCOW Model
Versions.
levels are caused by the same problem. In Figure 7 M0SC0W-
NPS shows that smaller Combat Power ratios result in a greater
number of surviving defenders. This reflects the fact that
a weaker attacking force is unable to attrite as many
defenders before being annihilated. M0SC0W-M1 shows the same
trend, but the solution it based on an incorrect engagement
time.
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When the attacker lacks sufficient combat power, the
procedure used in MOSCOW-MI underestimates the true
Lanchester-based engagement time, attacker's attrition level,
and defender's attrition level. The coding modifications to
the Lanchester square law equations in MOSCOW-MI attempt to
compensate for a weak battle termination rule. The effect is
that under some conditions the model may declare solutions in
terms of time and attrition which are infeasible under
Lanchester square law conditions.
C. LANCHESTER CALIBRATION COEFFICIENT L609
This calibration coefficient has no name, but is referred
to in the calibration coefficient input section as the
"Exponent of Numerical Strength in Lanchester Equations."
This calibration coefficient is hereafter referred to as the
"Lanchester coefficient." This calibration coefficient is
present to allow the user to modify the standard Lanchester
time of engagement equation. The general form of the equation
for the X force in MOSCOW-MI is:
j





Txbp = T ln 1 ~T \ (18)
(ab)~ I X -(|)nY J
where n is the value selected for the Lanchester coefficient.
This time equation corresponds to the Lanchester square law
only if n equals two.
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Romero's intent for changing the value for this
calibration coefficient is to allow the user the flexibility
of altering the time and subsequent attrition levels for
engagements when the results fail to meet user requirements.
The idea is that the time and subsequent attrition results can
be "scaled" to the appropriate levels by changing this
calibration coefficient value.
The problem with changing this coefficient is that the
user is altering a time equation which is the unique solution
to the set of differential equations and initial conditions
defined by the Lanchester square law. The Lanchester square
law begins by stating that attrition for opposing X and Y
forces have the following differential form:
dx = -aY and dy = -bX (19)
dt dt
With initial conditions that at time zero, both forces begin










where a and b are the constant rates at which X and Y firers
kill enemy units.
These differential equations can be solved simultaneously
as a second order homogeneous linear differential equation
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initial value problem. The details of the solution are
provided by Taylor [Ref. 6:pp. 222-231]. The solution for the
X force as a function of time equation is:
X(TBP ) = ± {(X - Jf Y )^T- + (X + 7f Y )«-^T"} (21)
Hartman [Ref. 5:pp. 12-13] also shows how this force level
equation is solved for a corresponding equation which yields
the time to reach a particular level of X force attrition.
This equation is:
, f X UP — wXBP — X + ^ Y
"J
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which is identical to Equation (18) with n=2
.
The point is that the form of this time equation is
uniquely determined by the solution methods used starting with
the initial square law differentials. By changing the
Lanchester coefficient (n) , the form of the attrition
differentials which would yield the modified time equation is
unknown. Without understanding the form of the original
differentials implied by the modification, the user is
plotting a course into uncharted territory where model results
are unpredictable.
A feasible alternative may be the use of Helmbold
equations, which are Lanchester type equations with an
additional parameter that allows the user to modify them to
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the desired form [Ref. 5:p. 18]. The underlying principles
of these equations are well published, and therefore
preferable to changing the Lanchester calibration coefficient
in MOSCOW, which arbitrarily modifies the Lanchester square
law solution.
The Lanchester coefficient in cell L609 should be set at
a value of two so that model results rely on a well understood
Lanchester square law foundation.
D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS
Recommended calibration coefficient ranges are summarized
in Appendix A and detailed in Appendix B. The objective of
the sensitivity analysis is to determine the amount of change
in MOSCOW MOE that one may expect when a calibration
coefficient value is changed from the "low" end to the "high"
end of the recommended range. The amount of MOE change
provides information about how sensitive model results are to
calibration coefficient changes within the recommended value
range
.
A 2 k factorial experimental design is used to determine
the effect of calibration coefficient changes on MOSCOW MOE.
Micro-computer capacity limitations preclude performing a
single 2 27 factorial experiment which includes all 27 of the
tested coefficients. The best alternative was to partition
the 27 coefficients into smaller subsets that appeared most
likely to interact. Five sets of eight coefficients each were
selected, for a total of five 2 8 factorial experiments. Each
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experiment determined the effect of the eight coefficients on
each of five MOSCOW MOE for an example scenario. The scenario
inputs for the experiments are listed in Appendix D.
The MOE included in each of the experiments are identified
below.
1. Initial Number of Maneuver (MVR) Units Required. This
MOE represents the number of Blue Maneuver units
required to achieve campaign success. It does not
include replacement personnel or vehicles required to
maintain these units at full strength during the
campaign.
2. Replacement Personnel. This MOE is the number of
personnel replacements to maintain maneuver units at
full strength during the campaign. This value reflects
casualties incurred during the campaign by BLUE maneuver
units.
3. Replacement Vehicles Needed. This measure is the number
of replacement vehicles that are required to maintain
Blue units at full strength during the campaign. The
MOE represents vehicle losses by Blue Units.
4. Ammunition Required. Ammunition required is the tonnage
of ammunition fired by Blue units during the campaign.
5. Campaign Length. This MOE is the time, in days, that
Blue forces delay Red forces from reaching a specified
penetration limit during the campaign. Campaign success
is measured in terms of achieving a given attrition
level on the Red force by the time this penetration is
reached. Campaign success is always achieved by the
Blue force, but the amount of delay imposed varies by
the set of inputs which describe the "concept" of
warfare used in the scenario. Blue units desire longer
delay times.
In a factorial experiment, each coefficient (called a
factor) has two values, called levels, "high" and "low." A
test is performed (in this case a MOSCOW model run) for all
possible level combinations, and MOE results are recorded.
Since MOSCOW is a deterministic model, no test variation
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considerations are required, therefore, repetition to estimate
effect variation is unnecessary. The "effect" of a factor
(coefficient) measured by the experiment, is the difference
between the average MOE value for all model runs when the
factor is at a high level and the average MOE value for all
model runs when the same factor is at a low level. The
effect of a factor represents the average range of change
observed for an MOE due to changing the level of the factor.
This range of change just described is specified in MOE units
of measure. For example, if an effect of a factor on
ammunition is 350, it means that varying the factor causes the
ammunition MOE to change by an average of 350 tons. This
method requires the user to "scale" the listed effects to the
actual MOE value. For example, a 350 ton range change for
ammunition is a large effect if the average ammunition value
is 700, but small if the average MOE value is 35000 tons.
Rather than report effects in terms of MOE units, the
effects described above can be divided by the average MOE
values for all model runs. This technique does not alter
2 • • ...This is the same type of sensitivity analysis performed
by Hoffman [Ref. 4:pp. 18-22], except that this analysis
applies exclusively to calibration coefficients. Hoffman's
work dealt with force and scenario inputs. Effect
significance was computed using a modified version of the
Input Sensitivity program written by Hoffman [Ref. 4;pp. 95-
98]. The modification uses the average MOE value for all
model runs, (rather than the average MOE value for model runs
when the input is at a low level) for determining the
significance level of an input's effect. This code
modification consists of replacing the code "MOE[;l]" with
" (+/MOE)-f(256) " in lines 103 and 115 of Hoffman's program.
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results, but allows effects to be reported on a common,
dimensionless scale. The effect of a factor in these terms
becomes the percentage change observed for an MOE due to
changing the level of the factor. The advantage of this
method is that readers do not have to be familiar with the
relative order of magnitude between the effect and the average
MOE value. The effects listed below are in percentage terms,
which implicitly specify relative magnitudes. For example,
the effect of a factor listed as -.09 on ammunition means that
changing the factor from a high to low level causes the
average MOE value to decrease by nine percent. Note that
effects have signed values. A positive effect means that
changing the factor from a high to a low level increases the
average MOE value by the listed percentage.
The effects listed in Tables 1 through 5 are those which
cause at least a one percent change in MOE results. The
actual level of significance (the percentage change a factor
has on an MOE) of each factor is listed for each tested MOE.
Presenting the effects in this manner allows readers to make
their own judgments about the significance of each factor's
effect. Factors which cause less than a one percent MOE value
change are not listed because they are obviously not
significant for the tested scenario.
The following eleven calibration coefficients failed to






FACTOR MVR UNITS PERSONNEL VEHICLE AMMUNITION CAMPAIGN
(CAL. COEFFICIENT) REQUIRED REPLACEMENTS REPLACEMENTS REQUIRED LENGTH
L665 -.0106 -.0104
L667 .0787 .0508 .0472 .0189








FACTOR MVR UNITS PERSONNEL VEHICLE AMMUNITION CAMPAIGN
(CAL. COEFFICIENT) REQUIRED REPLACEMENTS REPLACEMENTS REQUIRED LENGTH
L621 -.1717 -.1194 -.1249 -.0549 -.0170
L654 .0100
L678 .0346 .0986 .0898 .0135 .0125
L686 .0211 .0186 .0180
L708 -.0963 .-.0643 -.0678 -.0294
L711 .0554 .0279 .0266 -.0286 -.0393
L621* L708 .0963 .0643 .0678 .0294
L621* L711 -.0113
LEGEND
L621 BASELINE%REST L686 D1SMTDLETCOEF
L654 PWRCOEFIERR-ATK L708 LOWRESTCOEF





FACTOR MVR UNITS PERSONNEL VEHICLE AMMUNITION CAMPAIGN
(CAL. COEFFICIENT) REQUIRED REPLACEMENTS REPLACEMENTS REQUIRED LENGTH
L619 -.3749 -.0191 -.0383 -.0375 .0332
L690 -.0300 .0103
L692 -.0362 .0135 .0111
L696 .0503 .0180
L701 .0171 .0146 .0202
L619*L692 .0192
LEGEND:
L619 HRS/DEFPREP% L696 HQBURDC0EFC3ER





FACTOR MVR UNITS PERSONNEL VEHICLE AMMUNITION CAMPAIGN
(CAL. COEFFICIENT) REQUIRED REPLACEMENTS REPLACEMENTS REQUIRED LENGTH
L619 -.3450 -.0196 -.0375 .0327 .0299
L621 -.1674 -.1181 -.1235 -.0535 -.0160
L639 -.0154
L708 -.0946 -.0628 -.0664 -.0283
L621* L706 .0947 .0628 .0663 .0283
LEGEND:
L619 HRS/DEFPREP% L639 REDVEH/KM2SEC





FACTOR MVR UNITS PERSONNEL VEHICLE AMMUNITION CAMPAIGN
(CAL. COEFFICIENT) REQUIRED REPLACEMENTS REPLACEMENTS REQUIRED LENGTH
L667 .0805 -.0308 .0147 .0299
L670 .0770 .0904 -.0160
L678 .0694 .0648
L686 .0208 .0613




























Varying these coefficient values within the tested range
fails to produce any significant change in any of the five
test MOE for the example scenario. These results imply that
little attention need be paid when selecting their input
values, since they do not significantly affect model results.
The sensitivity experimentation results do not provide final
answers concerning the utility of these coefficients. The
factorial experiments only provide initial indications about
the effect of these coefficients.
The possibility exists that the tested scenario failed to
create a situation that allowed some coefficients to have
significant effect. For example, RED (or BLUE) LEADVEH-ATK,
(L626 and L631) , only have influence in the model if a narrow
defense frontage reduces the attacker's desired combat power.
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If the defense frontage is not too small, these coefficients
have no effect in that particular scenario.
A second possibility is that the model adequately
represents combat processes which have little or no effect in
an actual campaign. For example, it may be that aerial
interdiction delay missions have little effect, in general,
in the outcome of a campaign. In this case, PWRCOEFAIDEL
(L663), which had no significant effect in the experiments,
may be properly represented by the model.
Another possibility is that the model fails to adequately
represent some actual combat processes. For example, one
would expect that air support, in general, has a significant
impact on campaign outcome. The experiments show that only
one of the four coefficients which modify air support has a
significant effect on MOSCOW MOE. If the input values for
these coefficients properly represent air support
capabilities, then the model may inadequately represent air
support effects on campaign outcome.
Finding particular reasons why each coefficient has the
effect determined by this set of experiments is a considerable
task beyond the intended purpose of this research. Examining
causes for the listed effects should be the focus of
additional work on the model. The effects should be
considered as an indicator, not the final explanation, of the




Rand Corporation should revise MOSCOW documentation. Work
by Hoffman, [Refs. 3 and 4] and this analysis, provide
additional information about MOSCOW. The need for this
information is primarily based upon the lack of detailed
user's guidance in Rand documentation for selecting MOSCOW
inputs. Hoffman's work [Ref. 3] should be used to add a
section to Rand's User's Guide, [Ref. 2] explaining one
methodology for aggregating MOSCOW inputs for opposing forces.
Appendix B of this document should be used to add a section
to Rand's User's Guide for selecting MOSCOW calibration
coefficients. Supplementing existing documentation with this
information would assist MOSCOW user's to determine sets of
inputs which reflect their desired "concept" of operational
warfare.
Rand Corporation should consider revising portions of
MOSCOW code. The findings in Chapter IV explain the weakness
in MOSCOW-MI 's battle termination rule. MOSCOW-MI coding
should be revised to support the breakpoint hypothesis
developed in Chapter IV. Revision to include the breakpoint
hypothesis is easy to perform, does not complicate the model,
but yields greater flexibility and more reliable model
results. The required code changes, already included in
MOSCOW-NPS, are listed in Appendix C.
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Additional code corrections are required to correct
problems that exist in the application of calibration
coefficients to modelled sub-processes. Code corrections made
for MOSCOW-NPS to eliminate problems found in MOSCOW-MI are
also listed in Appendix C. Rand should compare these code
corrections to the MOSCOW-MI version and make appropriate
revisions.
Additional sensitivity analysis should be performed on
MOSCOW. A number of calibration coefficients appear to have
little effect on MOSCOW results. These calibration
coefficients identified in Chapter IV should be analyzed in
more detail to determine if they consistently fail to affect
model results over a wide range of scenario types. If these
coefficients provide effects under special conditions, the
information should be included in model documentation. If the
coefficients consistently fail to affect MOSCOW results, the
code should be revised or the coefficients removed from the
model. The purpose of additional sensitivity analysis, a
substantial task, should be to explain why calibration
coefficients show particular effects on various MOSCOW MOE.
Interested model users should use MOSCOW-NPS until a
suitable revision is made by Rand Corporation. MOSCOW-NPS
contains code revisions which make it an improved version of
MOSCOW-MI. MOSCOW-NPS provides Lanchester square law results
based upon the breakpoint hypothesis explained in Chapter IV.
Appendix B also provides calibration coefficient selection
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guidance that does not apply to some portions of the Rand
version of MOSCOW. Other inputs for the two versions of the
model are identical. MOSCOW-MI should only be used after
suitable revision is made which corrects model coding, and
improved model documentation is published. Inquiries about
MOSCOW-NPS should be referred to Dr. S. Parry at the address
listed in the distribution section of this work. Moscow-Mi's
author, P. Romero, believes that future model documentation
should include information provided by this thesis and work
by Hoffman. The incorporation of code changes listed in
Appendix C will depend upon RAND Corporation's evaluation of
the incensed utility that may be realized from their use.
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APPENDIX A
ABBREVIATED CALIBRATION COEFFICIENT INFORMATION
The tables below summarize the value ranges which apply
to each calibration coefficient. The coefficient name and
spreadsheet cell reference are listed to facilitate cross
reference with the model. The feasible range column
identifies calibration coefficient values which MOSCOW will
accept and still run. The likely range column represents the
calibration coefficient range recommended for use as a result
of this analysis. The sub-process affected by each
coefficient appears reasonable when selecting values from the
likely range. The tested levels column reports the levels at
which each coefficient was varied during sensitivity analysis.
TABLE 6.
MOSCOW CALIBRATION COEFFICIENT RANGES-MANDATORY LIST
COEFFICIENT CELL FEASABLE RANGE LIKELY RANGE TESTED LEVELS
LANCH EXP L609 Fix at 2.0 2.0 2.0
TEMPO L613 Fix at 1.0 1.0 1.0
HRS/DEFPREP% L619 (0, 8) (0. 1) (.25, .75)
BASELINE%REST L621 (0, 1) (.2, .33) (.2, .33)
MAXFIRESPT L623 (0, INF) (.25, 1.75) (.5, 1.5)
REDLEADVEH-ATK L628 (0, 1) (.05, .95) (.10, .50)
BLULEADVEH-ATK L631 (0, 1) (.05, .95) (.10, .50)
BLUVEHKM2SEC L636 (0, INF) (0, SMALL) (.003, .01)
REDVEH/KM2SEC L639 (0, INF) (0, SMALL) (.003, .01)
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TABLE 7.
MOSCOW CALIBRATION COEFFICIENT RANGES-OPTIONAL LIST
COEFFICIENT CELL FEASABLE RANGE LIKELY RANGE TESTED LEVELS
PWRCOEFTGTAVAIL L651 (0. INF) (3, 15) (5, 12)
PWRCOEFIERR-ATK L654 (0, INF) (0, 2) (.5. 1.5)
PWRCOEFIERR-DEF L655 (0, INF) (0. 2) (.5, 1.5)
PWRCOEFCASKIL L657 (0, INF) (0, 1) (.25, .75)
PWRCOEFAIKILS L660 (0, INF) (0. 1) (.25. .75)
PWRCOEFAIDEL L663 (0, INF) (0, 1) (.25, .75)
PWRCOEFAIDISR L665 (0, INF) (0. i) (.25, .75)
FRNTAGELETHCOEF L667 (0. INF) (1. T48) (1. T48)
%REDBREAK/KM L670 (0, INF) (0, .01) (.002, .01)
MILUSBLCOEF L675 (0. INF) (0. 2) (.5. 1.5)
ATKTERMULTCOEF L678 (1, INF) (0. 5) (1. 5)
DISMTDVULNCOEF L683 (0. INF) (.5. 1.5) (.5, 1.5)
DISMTDLETHCOEF L685 (0, INF) (0, 1) (.25, .75)
IERRCOEFSURVTM L690 (0. INF) (0, 2) (.5, 1.5)
HQLOADDELCOEF L692 (0, INF) (0, 2) (.5, 1.5)
HQBURDDELCOEF L694 (0, INF) (0, 1) (.25, .75)
HQBURDC0EFC3ER L696 (0, INF) (0, 2) (.5, 1.5)
REDSURVDISCOEF L701 (1. INF) (3, 15) (5, 12)
RECONSTMCOEF L703 (0, INF) (0. .1) (.025, .075)
LOWRESTCOEF L708 (0, INF) (0, 4) (.5, 1.5)
(Not Named) L711 (0, INF) (0, 2) (.5, 1.5)
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The following abbreviated definitions provide quick
reference about the use of each calibration coefficient. A
detailed description for each coefficient is given in Appendix
B.
L609, LANCHESTER EXPONENT
Allows model users to alter the basic form of the
Lanchester square law time of battle equation.
L613, TEMPO
Allows model users to modify the time of battle reported
to the model output section. The original engagement
time, computed by the Lanchester square law, is not
altered by this coefficient.
L619, HRS/DEFPREP%
The rate at which forces spend time to achieve one
percent increments of additional terrain protection by
preparing defense.
L621, BASELINE%REST
The threshold level of rest (in fractions of a day)
below which soldiers begin to lose some degree of
effectiveness.
L623, MAXFIRESPT
An upper bound (in multiples of maneuver unit lethality)
on the lethality that Artillery and close air support
may have in the model.
L628, REDLEADVEH-ATK
The fraction of the Red force's vehicles that lead Red
attacks.
L631, BLULEADVEH-ATK
The fraction of the Blue force's vehicle that lead Blue
attacks.
L63 6, BLUVEHKM2/SEC
The number of Blue personnel (not vehicles as indicated
by the name) per square kilometer which are assigned
security force missions. These forces are not involved
in engagements.
L639, REDVEH/KM2SEC
The number of Red personnel (not vehicles as indicated
by the name) per square kilometer which are assigned




Affects target availability of a force, to the enemy,
based on the effects of relative force ratio.
L654, PWRCOEFIERR-ATK
Affects the availability of attacking force targets to
the defender, based upon intelligence error and the
"risk" involved in the aggressive nature of the attack.
L655, PWRCOEFIERR-DEF
Affects the availability of defending force targets to
the attacker based upon intelligence error and force
ratio effects.
L657, PWRCOEFCASKIL
Affects the lethality of Artillery and close air support




Affects the lethality of aerial interdiction sorties
based upon force ratio.
L663, PWRCOEFAIDEL
Affects the amount of enemy movement delay caused by
aerial interdiction delay sorties based upon force
ratio.
L665, PWRCOEFAIDISR
Affects the amount by which aerial interdiction sorties
increase enemy C3 error based upon force ratio.
L667, FRNTAGELETHCOEF
Reduces the amount of terrain protection defenders
receive when they attempt to defend a wider frontage
than allowed by their normal capability.
L670, %REDBREAK/KM
The fraction of Red force vehicles that are lost due to
non-combat related "breakdowns".
L675, MILUSBLCOEF
Affects the fraction of the campaign zone considered
militarily usable. Only militarily usable terrain is
occupied by opposing forces.
L678, ATKTERMULTCOEF
Reduces the amount of terrain protection an attacker
receives by virtue of being the aggressor.
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L683, DISMTDVULNCOEF
Determines the vulnerability of dismounted Infantry.
L685, DISMTDLETHCOEF
Determines the degree by which dismounted Infantry
modifies a force's lethality.
L690, IERRCOEFSURVTM
Determines the Time of the Survey and Reconnaissance
Activity for a force based on its level of intelligence
error.
L692, HQLOADDELCOEF
Affects the amount of "wasted" time caused by the "load"
(in number of subordinate units commanded) on a force's
headquarters elements.
L694, HQBURDDELCOEF
Affects the amount of "wasted" time caused by
headquarters elements when they command more subordinate
units than their normal design capacity.
L69 6, HQBURDC0EFC3ER
Determines the amount by which a force's C3 error
increases due to headquarters burden (see L694)
.
L701, REDSURVDISCOEF
Affects the ability of Red force survivors to delay Blue
force disengagements.
L7 03, RECONSTMCOEF
Affects the amount of time Blue forces spend re-
organizing and assessing casualties between engagements.
L7 08, LOWRESTCOEF
Affects the degree by which lack of rest degrades Blue
force effectiveness (movement and lethality)
.
L711, (Not Named)
Affects the ability of Red forces to overcome the
effects of C3 error by outmaneuvering Blue forces.
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APPENDIX B
DETAILED CALIBRATION COEFFICIENT INFORMATION
This appendix provides detailed descriptions of MOSCOW
calibration coefficients. The descriptions are intended for
MOSCOW users who are already familiar with RAND's
documentation on the model [Ref. 1 and 2]. Guidance for other
inputs may be found in Hoffman's work [Ref. 3 and 4].
Furthermore, this appendix provides MOSCOW users with
information to intelligently select input values for these
coefficients. Each description results from analysis of the
MOSCOW model using the methodology outlined in Chapter III.
Recommended ranges for each coefficient contain values which,
in the author's best judgement, make each modelled combat sub-
process function within reasonable limits.
RAND's current version of the model, by Romero, is called
MOSCOW-MI. Many model code corrections were made to this
version. These corrections resulted from the verification of
the model's code to ensure that modelled sub-processes
correspond with documented intent, had symmetrical effects on
opposing Red and Blue forces, or met with intuitive appeal.
A revised version of MOSCOW, called MOSCOW-NPS, contains all
of the code corrections listed in Appendix C. The
descriptions presented here apply to MOSCOW-NPS. MOSCOW-MI
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currently retains calibration coefficient problems discovered
as a by-product of this analysis.
Actual calibration coefficient names are used to
facilitate cross reference with MOSCOW spreadsheet code and
existing documentation. The headings for each calibration
coefficient include its name and the corresponding spreadsheet
input cell (e.g., LOWRESTCOEF, cell L706.). This method is
used because the calibration input section uses only cell
references. The spreadsheet code predominantly refers to
coefficient names. Figures in this appendix contain
coefficient names and corresponding spreadsheet cell
references. MOSCOW users should find this technique valuable
when using the model.
LANCHESTER Coefficient, cell L609.
This coefficient is used to modify the form of the basic
Lanchester square law equations used in MOSCOW'S attrition
module. Lanchester square law equations use a value of two
for this coefficient. Selecting values other than two may
lead to unpredictable results since the form of the underlying
attrition differentials are unknown for these values. (See
Chapter IV, part B, for the details which argue for fixing
this coefficient at a value of two.)
TEMPO, cell L611.
MOSCOW computes the time friendly units spend in various
activities during the campaign. The model user may analyze
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the time distribution among these activities to determine
differences between warfighting concepts. Three activities,
ATK1, ATK2, and DEFEND represent the time spent actually
engaging the enemy during the campaign. Other activities
represent time units spend in preparation and support events
required to sustain the capability to engage the enemy during
the campaign. Time spent in ATK1, ATK2 , and DEFEND activities
is based upon Lanchester square law results computed in the
attrition module. The length of each engagement depends upon
relative combat power and attrition preferences for opposing
forces.
The TEMPO coefficient is a constant, set by the user, to
adjust the Lanchester based engagement time as computed in
the attrition module, before it is reported to the Time of
Activities section of the model. TEMPO does not affect how
MOSCOW calculates attrition. The coefficient only adjusts the
engagement time listed in model output.
This coefficient should be left set to a value of one.
Model users should understand, and take into consideration,
the implications of using Lanchester based attrition when
using the model. The time of the battle and relative
attrition levels for each force depend upon this attrition
method. When the user finds that length of engagements and
corresponding attrition levels appear inappropriate, then the
cause for the discrepancy should be researched in terms of the
inputs which lead to the calculation of Lanchester lethality
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parameters. These lethality parameters set the pace of the
battle by defining the "intensity" or lethality of engagements
[Ref. 5:p. 5.7]. Engagement times should be modified by
defining inputs which affect these lethality parameters to
suit user requirements within the square law formulation.
Changing the TEMPO coefficient provides a false impression
that the level of engagement attrition is achieved in the
modified time under a square law formulation, when in fact,
this is not the case.
HRS/DEFPREP%, cell L619.
MOSCOW allows defending units to increase their defense
strength by spending time preparing defense. A set of terrain
inputs describes the relative fraction of different terrain
types that exist within the campaign zone. Each terrain type
has an associated "defense strength" value. The larger this
defense strength value, the more protection a defender
receives during engagements due to terrain advantage. The
defender is always provided a level of protection
corresponding to the average defense strength of all terrain
in the zone. The defender may choose to spend time "preparing
defense" to increase this average level of terrain protection.
The amount of additional protection available is equal to the
difference between the defense strengths of the "average" and
"most defensible" terrain in the zone. For example, let
1. Defense strength of most defensible terrain type = 2.00.
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2. Defense strength of average terrain in zone = 1.10.
The amount of additional protection, or "defense strength"
available to the defender by preparing defense is (2.00 -
1.10) = .90.
The input "Defense Prep%" is the fraction of additional
protection available that the defender chooses to achieve by
spending additional time preparing defense positions. A value
of zero for "Defense Prep%" implies that the defender receives
only the average terrain defense strength. A value of one
implies that the defender receives all addition protection,
which eguals that corresponding to the most defensible terrain
in the zone. It costs the defender time to increase his level
of protection. The defender must weigh the fraction of
additional protection desired against the time "penalty" spent
in a "prepare defense" activity. Additional protection is an
advantage during engagements, but time spent preparing defense
means a unit is unavailable for combat for a longer period
between engagements. The calibration coefficient HRS/DEFPREP%
is the number of hours required to increase the defender's
strength by one percent of the additional terrain protection
available. The coefficient is a rate, selected by model users
to represent the time penalty a defender pays to improve
defense positions.
For example, given the strength information above, let:
1. Defense Prep% = .50
2. HRS/DEFPREP% = .45
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The defense strength achieved is then:
1.10 + .5(2.00 - 1.10) = 1.55
at a "Prepare Defense" activity cost of:
.45 X 100(.5) = 22.5 [HRS] = .9375 [DAYS].
Figure 8 shows how "Prepare Defense" activity time is affected
by HRS/DEFPREP% values between zero and one. As HRS/DEFPREP%
increases the activity time is more sensitive to changes in
the fraction of additional protection (Defense Prep%) selected
by the defender. The recommended range for this calibration
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Figure 8. Time of Prepare Defense Activity as a Function
of HOURS/DEF PREP% and DEFENSE PREP%
.
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that the defender must spend one day preparing defense to gain
each additional one percent increase in terrain protection.
Setting this value to one implies that a defender can achieve
increased protection with no preparation time.
BASELINE%REST, cell L621.
BASELINE%REST is simply the fraction of a day units must
sleep, or rest, to maintain their standard effectiveness
level. This coefficient is set to a reasonable value for the
amount of rest soldiers require to be fully effective. The
recommended range is between .2 and .33 days (roughly 5-8
hours)
.
This calibration coefficient is used as a threshold level
for rest and is explained further in the section on
"LOWRESTCOEF." The actual rest a unit receives is a separate
input which, when used with BASELINE%REST, determines whether
effectiveness (lethality and mobility) is degraded by lack of
rest.
MAXFIRESPT, cell L623.
MOSCOW combines the kill rates from maneuver units,
general support indirect fire, and air support for use as
lethality parameters in its Lanchester based attrition module
The effect of sleep varies between individuals, however,
there is reason to believe that approximately eight hours of sleep
per day provides adequate rest for humans engaged in continuous
operations. This implies that values close to .33 should be used.
See Reference 7 for one example of research into this topic.
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calculations. General support indirect fires and air support
kill rates are combined first into a single "support" kill
rate. MAXFIRESPT is any fraction or multiple of the maneuver
kill rate. Before being added to the maneuver kill rate, the
"support" kill rate is compared to the kill rate defined by
MAXFIRESPT. The purpose of MAXFIRESPT is to allow the user
to establish an upper bound for the "support" kill rate as a
function of the maneuver kill rate. The lesser of the
"support" or upper bound kill rate defined by MAXFIRESPT is
the actual value added to the maneuver kill rate.
The value selected for MAXFIRESPT depends upon the
scenario modelled. A value less than one implies that support
air and artillery cannot have a higher total lethality than
maneuver units. A value greater than one implies that air and
artillery can have a higher combined lethality than maneuver
units.
A value between .25 and 1.75 for MAXFIRESPT appears
reasonable for most scenarios. This range is recommended
because support air and artillery capability, relative to
maneuver, based on current U.S. Army unit task organization
falls well within these limits. Model users should carefully
consider this upper bound value based on the relative mix of
maneuver and support assets. When setting this value the
model user is actually specifying an upper bound on the
effects of indirect fire and air support, reflecting some
inherent expectation of the model user. If the actual
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"support" kill rate determined by MOSCOW exceeds this bound
then it also exceeds the user's expectation. In such a case
it may be wise to examine the inputs which MOSCOW uses when
computing "support" lethality to determine the cause rather
than blindly accepting model results. If "support" lethality
appears reasonable perhaps maneuver lethality is lower than
expected.
REDLEADVEH-ATK, cell L628, and BLUELEADVEH-ATK, cell L631.
These calibration coefficients are defined as the
percentage of an attacking force's vehicles that actually lead
the attack. Each coefficient has the same effect, but allow
different values to be selected for opposing forces. Their
effect is to determine the maximum number of vehicles an
attacker may use against a defender.
The attacking force will attempt to gather the number of
vehicles reguired to attack with the desired ATTACKER/DEFENDER
combat power ratio. These calibration coefficients are used
in a part of MOSCOW that captures the effect that "shoulder"
space has on the attackers ability to mass the desired number
of vehicles in the attack. This "shoulder" space is the
frontage within which vehicles must fit when conducting an
attack.
Figure 9 demonstrates how frontage limits the number of
vehicles that can be physically placed "on-line" in the
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Figure 9. Relationship Between VEH DIS-ATK and Attack
Frontage for Computing the Maximum Number of Vehicles
Which Can Be Placed 'On Line' in an Attack.
inputs defined by the defender. Attack frontage equals this
defender frontage. The attacker selects a minimum lateral
distance between attack vehicles corresponding to the desired
"warfighting style." This distance is an input called
"DISVEH-ATK." Attack frontage divided by "DISVEH-ATK" defines
the maximum number of vehicles that can be placed "on-line"
in an attack. The maximum number of "on-line" vehicles
represents some portion of the total attacking force.
The calibration coefficients (RED or BLUE) LEADVEH-ATK are
inputs which specify the fraction of the attacker's total
force which lead their attack "on-line." The maximum number
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of vehicles that may be placed "on-line" and these calibration
coefficients define the upper limit for the total number of
attacking vehicles used in an engagement. The upper limit is
simply the maximum number of "on-line" vehicles divided by the
calibration coefficient (RED or BLUE) LEADVEH-ATK.
Figure 10 shows the relationship described above. These
calibration coefficients may be interpreted as defining the
"depth" of the attack. A calibration coefficient value of one
means that the entire attacking force is placed "on-line."
This means that the upper bound on total vehicles equals the
number that will fit "on-line" in the attack frontage width.
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Figure 10. Coefficient RED (or BLUE) LEADVEH-ATK Determines
Maximum Attacking Vehicles Allowed During Engagements.
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A calibration coefficient value of .5 means that the upper
limit on total attack vehicles equals twice that which fit
"on-line" in the attack frontage width. A smaller calibration
coefficient value implies more "depth", increasing the maximum
allowable total number of attacking vehicles.
It is important to understand that this process determines
the attacker's upper bound for vehicles. The actual number
of vehicles used in an attack is the minimum of this upper
bound or the number of vehicles required to mass the
attacker's desired attack/defender combat power ratio. If the
upper bound is the minimum, then attacks are conducted at some
combat power ratio smaller than the attacker's preference.
The value for these calibration coefficients must always be
greater than zero and less than or equal to one.
BLUVEH/KM2SEC, cell L636, and REDVEH/KM2SEC, cell L639.
These calibration coefficients are used to determine the
number of security forces required for each opponent. The
security forces are not used during engagements but represent
the units that must be "reserved" to provide security while
the rest of the force conducts assigned missions. The amount
of security required depends upon force needs corresponding
to the "warfighting style" and "risk" accepted by decision
makers.
In MOSCOW, campaign operations are conducted in an area
represented by a rectangular zone similar to that shown in
Figure 11. The Red force attacks from the zone forward
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SOLDIERS PER UNIT: 12.000 9.000
60 km 66 km
PERS/KM2SZC: 2.0 1.6
SECURITY FORCES REQUIRED:
BLUE: 16.500 x 2.0 / 12.000 2.75 MVR UNITS
RED: 8.260 x 16 / 8.000 • 1.376 MVR UNITS
Figure 11. Geometric Interpretation for Determining
Security Forces Required.
boundary until it reaches a penetration distance ending the
campaign. MOSCOW determines a campaign midpoint corresponding
to the location of the Red force front lines at half of total
campaign time. The shaded area for each force represents the
average zone area each side must secure during the campaign.
(BLUE or RED) PER/KM2SEC equals the number of soldiers per
square kilometer required to secure the shaded area for each
side discussed above. The calibration coefficients are
multiplied by their respective shaded area to determine the
total number of soldiers used for security. MOSCOW converts
the total number of security soldiers to maneuver units
required for security.
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Selecting values for these two calibration coefficients
is difficult because the process is represented in an awkward
fashion. Model users are forced to select "soldier density"
(the number of soldiers per square kilometer) which ultimately
converts to maneuver unit requirements. Military operations
planners determine security force requirements in quite a
different manner, namely, by allocating units to security
missions. In doing so, operations planners consider such
factors as terrain type, logistical or support force
vulnerability, overall mission, force structure, and risk to
establish security forces.
The MOSCOW computation is given by:
Security Force [MVR UNITS] = (zone width)x(distance to campaign midpoint)x
(RED or BLUE PERS/KMSEC)x(MVR UNITS/soldier) . (23)
A MVR UNIT is the type of maneuver unit user defines in the
model input section. MOSCOW uses MVR UNITS, each consisting
of a number of vehicles and personnel, as the basic fighting
element in the model.
Since this calculation can hardly be interpreted as
representing an actual process of security force allocation,
corresponding calibration coefficients are of equally dubious
worth. One way to deal with this situation is to select
calibration values which effectively eliminate the calculation
of security forces from the model. This can be accomplished
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by setting these values to zero. If other values are
selected, model users are warned to closely examine the
relative numbers of maneuver units used for engagements versus
security requirements in model output.
PWRCOEFTGTAVAIL, cell L651.
In actual combat, firers are unable to engage some portion
of the enemy force for a variety of reasons. For example,
terrain provides concealment which "hides" targets, and also
provides "cover" which "protects" targets. The use of terrain
has the effect, then, of making some fraction the enemy
unavailable as targets. In MOSCOW the user can select the
base fraction of each force that is unavailable as targets to
capture this effect. This base level of target availability
is adjusted by several factors within the model.
PWRCOEFTGTAVAIL determines the degree to which targets,
previously unavailable, are made available due to the relative
force ratio in an engagement. The idea is that the stronger
force (in terms of numbers) makes a larger fraction of itself
available as targets since there is more difficulty in
concealing higher numbers of personnel and equipment. The
effect of force ratio on target availability only affects the
stronger force in MOSCOW. This process usually affects the
attacker since the majority of scenarios involve a stronger
force attacking a weaker defender.
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Figure 12 demonstrates the use of PWRCOEFTGTAVAIL. The
surface shows that as the force ratio increases, the more a
stronger force's previously unavailable targets become
available. The sensitivity of target availability to force
ratio is determined by PWRCOEFTGTAVAIL. A smaller coefficient
value means that target availability is very sensitive to
force ratio. Larger PWRCOEFTGTAVAIL values imply that force
ratio has little effect on target availability.
^ ^^^\K \ *o ^sZr\\ \ \ V
— w ^y^\\ \\\ Jf\h -i ^Z?\\ \\\ jc\ \
Uffl ^^<\\\\\X\\













off III /\ A^^T\ '*^K ^^^^VlAA X**o(Ly jCjc\.
>cc 0.2
LUUJ ^S 1 / li^V? If Y * X /x .i?Q''^v )v /Jo^TScV
£2
u.8
*^^"V/!^ /^^Sii'^S^^xS^c^^ "'^» 10
° F o^t'.^' ;TNf^">W; \a' j^'^C ^v'/^/^1^' *i3^*OsX?V!y <^^8
LL ^*i*<. ^VP^i^Sw^S^Siis^s^^^v*^^o 6^<J<<<S^S^OsSj^^l^i^/^v^
^<S3^2
PWRCOEFTGTAVA 1 L [ L651] if<^v ^*?5 FORCE RATIO
15
Figure 12. PWRCOEFTGTAVAIL Modifies the Degree to Which
Force Ratio Makes More of the Stronger Force's "Hidden"
Vehicles Available as Targets.
A range of values for PWRCOEFTGTAVAIL between about three
and fifteen appear to be most reasonable for this process.
Force ratio ought to have some effect, but not dominate all
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other effects, such as terrain, which determine availability.
For PWRCOEFTGTAVAIL values smaller than three target extremely
sensitive to force ratio. For example, consider a unit that
has is half of its vehicles available as targets before the
effect due to force ratio. If the unit attacks at a 3 to 1
ratio advantage with a PWRCOEFTGTAVAIL value of 3, then the
unit availability increases to over 96 percent. Such an
increase in target availability due to force ratio alone is
difficult to believe as being representative of the actual
effect. Given the same unit, but using a PWRCOEFTGTAVAIL of
15, availability does not change from the original one half,
demonstrating that coefficient values this large make
availability very insensitive to force ratio.
PWRCOEFIERR-ATK, cell L654 , and PWRCOEFIERR-DEF, cell L655.
In MOSCOW, users select a base level of intelligence
(INTEL) error for Red and Blue forces. The input INTEL error
is defined as the percentage of a unit's intelligence tasks
that are not performed to their standard level. MOSCOW uses
these inputs to capture the effect of intelligence error in
combat. When units conduct all intelligence tasks to standard
some amount of uncertainty about the enemy still exists. When
some number of intelligence tasks are ill-performed the
relative level of uncertainty increases, causing a loss in
unit combat effectiveness. The effectiveness degraded in
MOSCOW is in terms of lost opportunity, represented by
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reducing the number of enemy targets a unit possessing
intelligence error would otherwise be able to engage.
In the model, a unit's intelligence error reduces the
fraction of the enemy available as targets. Unit
effectiveness is degraded since units can only engage
available targets. The general form of the equation is:
% Enemy Avail = (Previous % Enemy Avail) x (1- INTEL error) (24)
The remaining discussion deals with the term (1- INTEL
error) . This term is the multiplier which reduces the
fraction of enemy targets available to a unit possessing
intelligence error. The intelligence (INTEL) error is
modified before being used in the above equation. The model
treats intelligence error for attacking and defending units
differently.
A defending unit's INTEL error is reduced by the
Defend/Attack force ratio. The idea is that the degrading
effect of intelligence error is reduced when the attacker uses
a larger number of attacking units. The larger target array
available to the defender mitigates the effect of INTEL error.
The multiplier for defending units is:




which reduces attacker availability due to defender intelli-
gence error.
Figure 13 shows the value for this multiplier for
different force ratios and PWRCOEFIERR-DEF levels. The figure
uses a defender intelligence error value of .10 for purposes
of the example. A PWRCOEFIERR-DEF value of zero corresponds
to the belief that force ratio has no effect on reducing
defender intelligence error, therefore, the fraction of attack
targets available to the defender remains at .90. Increasing
PWRCOEFIERR-DEF values imply that force ratio has a stronger
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Figure 13 . PWRCOEFIERR-DEF Determines How Force Ratio and
Defender Intelligence Error Affect Attacking Force
Availability as Targets.
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effect in reducing defender intelligence error, so the
fraction of attack targets available increases from .90.
MOSCOW users may select any positive PWRCOEFIERR-DEF value,
but values larger than two have about the same effect as using
zero for INTEL error in the main input section. The
recommended range for this calibration coefficient is from
zero to two.
Attacking unit INTEL error is modified by a different
factor. The idea is that the fraction of attacking targets
available to the defender affects the amount of intelligence
information collected. MOSCOW reduces the effect of
intelligence error on the attacker when a larger fraction of
the attacker is available to the defender. The equation
representing this reduction is:
Defender Availability Multiplier = 1- [1-(Fraction of attacker avai l)PWRC0EFIERR
" ATK
] (26)
Figure 14 shows how the multiplier changes for different
PWRCOEFIERR-ATK and force ratio combinations. This figure
also uses an attacking force INTEL error value of . 10 for
example purposes. A value of zero for PWRCOEFIERR-ATK implies
an attacker has no intelligence error, therefore, the
multiplier remains at one regardless of the fraction of the
attacker available. Increasing PWRCOEFIERR-ATK values imply
larger fractions of the attacking force must be exposed in
order to reduce an attacker's intelligence error.
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Figure 14. PWRCOEFIERR-ATK Determines How Attacking Force
Exposure and Intelligence Error Affect Defending Force
Availability as Targets.
The recommended range for PWRCOEFIERR-ATK is between zero
and five. Values of zero mean that attack force intelligence
error fails to decrease attacker effectiveness. Values
greater than five have about the same effect as not using this
optional coefficient.
PWRCOEFCASKIL, cell L657 .
PWRCOEFCASKIL affects the degree to which supporting air
and artillery kill rates change due to the enemy/friendly
force ratio. If the enemy has a stronger force, the effects
of friendly air and artillery are larger since there exists
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a higher enemy target density. How much larger support
effects become depends upon the value selected for
PWRCOEFCASKIL. Only the weaker force's (normally the
defender) kill rates are modified by this process. The air
and artillery kill rates are multiplied by a factor of the
form:
[Enemy/Friendly Force Ratio] PWRCOEFCASKIL (27)
The force ratio must be greater than one or the factor is
ignored in MOSCOW. Figure 15 shows the surface representing
PWRCOEFCASKIL [ L657] 1.5
FORCE RATIO
C ATTACK/ DEFEND}
Figure 15. PWRCOFCASKIL Determines How Force Ratio
(Representing Relative Target Density) Increases the
Weaker Force's Air and Artillery Lethality.
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this kill rate multiplier for various force ratio and
PWRCOEFCASKIL values. The resulting kill rates are applied
against enemy maneuver forces. Note that a value of zero for
PWRCOEFCASKIL implies that a stronger force ratio has no
effect in changing weaker force air and artillery kill rates.
Calibration coefficient values greater than one increase
support kill rates by unreasonably high factors, thus, the
recommended range for PWRCOEFCASKIL is between zero and one.
PWRCOEFAIKILS, cell L660, PWRCOEFAIDEL, cell L663, and
PWRCOEFAIDISR, cell L665.
These three coefficients work exactly as described for
PWRCOEFCASKIL except that they apply only to air assets having
air interdiction (AI) missions. PWRCOEFCASKIL applies to air
assets performing close air support to ground maneuver.
MOSCOW has inputs which describe what portion of total air
assets are devoted to aerial interdiction missions. Aircraft
involved in air interdiction are allocated to five mission
types.
1. AI Attrition—sorties devoted to destroying enemy forces
away from front line engagements.
2. AI Delay—sorties devoted to delaying enemy movement.
3
.
AI Disrupt—sorties devoted to disrupting command and
control (increasing C3 error).
4 AI Counter HQ--sorties devoted to suppressing enemy air
and artillery fires.
5. AI Supply—sorties devoted to destroying enemy supply
capacity.
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MOSCOW uses these three calibration coefficients to determine
the degree to which the force ratio modifies the effect
obtained in the first three AI missions listed above. The
effect rate of each AI mission is multiplied by a factor
exactly like that described in the section for PWRCOEFCASKIL.
The only difference is that each of the AI missions has the
effect described by their mission type. The following three
figures show the use of each calibration coefficient with
force ratio. The surface shape in each figure is identical
to Figure 15 for PWRCOEFCASKIL. The units of measure in the
vertical axis for Figures 16-18 describe the effects of each
AI mission type. The recommended range for each of these
three calibration coefficients is also between zero and one.
They exist as separate coefficients so that model users can
interpret differences in the way force ratio changes the
effect of each mission type.
FRNTAGELETHCOEF, cell L667.
In actual combat, the defender has the advantage of
occupying terrain that the attacker must seize in order to
meet campaign objectives. The defender's advantage typically
requires the attacker to mass more relative combat power to
win the engagement. In MOSCOW, this process is modelled by
reducing attacker lethality by some amount due to the
defensibility of terrain.
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PWRCOEFAIKILS [ L660] ORCE RATIO CENBvfT/FR I ENDLY}
Figure 16. PWRCOEFAIKILS Determines How Force Ratio
Modifies the Lethality of the Weaker Force's Aerial
Interdiction Sorties.
PWRCOEFAIDEL [L663J ORCE RATIO CENEMY/ FRIENDLY}
Figure 17 . PWRCOEFAIDEL Determines How Force Ratio
Modifies the Amount by Which the Weaker Force's Aerial
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Figure 18. PWRCOEFAIDIS Determines How Force Ratio
Modifies the Effect that the Weaker Force's Aerial
Interdiction Sorties Have on Enemy C3 Error.
A set of terrain inputs includes a factor representing the
defensibility of each type of terrain in the campaign zone.
MOSCOW determines an harmonically weighted average of all
terrain types and specifies an average terrain defensibility
multiplier (TERRDEFMULT) . Values for TERRDEFMULT start at
one, representing no defense advantage, and increase from one
as terrain defensibility improves.
The defender's advantage of occupying terrain is
represented in MOSCOW by reducing attacker lethality by
Attacker Lethality [enemy kiUs/min] = Previous Attacker Lethality x (1/TERRDEFMULT) (28)
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Note that increasing terrain defensibility increases
TERRDEFMULT, producing a corresponding decrease in attacker
lethality. The overall effect is to force the attacker to
mass more relative firepower to defeat the defender.
There is an exception to this procedure when defenders
attempt to defend a larger area than their capability allows.
In this case, the defender is categorized as "overextended."
MOSCOW monitors defending units to ensure that they are
defending along a frontage within their capability. The
defender loses some portion of its terrain advantage when
overextended. MOSCOW represents this phenomenon by modifying
the equation which reduces lethality to:
Attacker Lethality [Enemy Kills/Min] = Previous Lethality x (FRNTAGELETHCOEF/TERRDEFMULT) (29)
where FRNTAGELETHCOEF is a value greater than one.
FRNTAGELETHCOEF is a calibration coefficient which
determines the amount a defender will lose terrain advantage
by virtue of overextending its defense. The nature of this
process limits the range of values that should be selected for
FRNTAGELETHCOEF. Values for this coefficient should be
greater than one; otherwise the effect of overextension would
increase a defender's advantage. Conversely, values for this
coefficient should be less than or equal to the value for
TERRDEFMULT; otherwise the effect of overextension would add
to the attacker kill rate. If the model user believes that
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an overextended defender provides such an advantage to the
attacker then choose a FRNTAGELETHCOEF which is greater than
TERRDEFMULT.
The recommended range for FRNTAGELETHCOEF is between one
and the existing value for TERRDEFMULT. When the user desires
to use a FRNTAGELETHCOEF value equal to an unknown TERRDEFMULT
value, type "T48" into spreadsheet cell L667. This technique
automatically equates the calibration coefficient
FRNTAGELETHCOEF to the one MOSCOW computes for TERRDEFMULT.
%REDBREAK/KM, cell L670.
This coefficient, as its name implies, is simply the
percentage of Red force vehicles which "break down" for each
kilometer of penetration. The process captured by this
coefficient is that some fraction of combat vehicles are lost
to equipment failure or some other noncombat cause.
%REDBREAK/KM is a value multiplied against the Red Penetration
Limit input to determine the total fraction of Red force
vehicles lost by noncombat causes. The deeper the penetration
limit (in kilometers) and the larger the value of
%REDBREAK/KM, the more Red force vehicles are lost due to
"breakdown." The effect is to reduce the total number of Red
force vehicles that the Blue force must destroy during
engagements to meet campaign success objectives. This
reduction means less Blue force vehicles are needed to achieve
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campaign success than would be required without the use of
this coefficient.
The value selected for %REDBREAK/KM should normally be
very small. Only a very small percentage of the Red force
vehicle fleet should "break down" per kilometer. The model
user should consider the scenario inputs for rate of Red
advance and terrain types when selecting the coefficient
value. Faster rates of advance and rugged terrain should
imply a higher rate of Red break downs. The recommended value
for %REDBREAK/KM is between zero and .10. A value of .10
implies that during a 100 km penetration the Red force loses
a substantially large ten percent of its total strength due
to breakdowns. Since these vehicles are never returned to the
campaign, this rate seems to be a substantial cost for
movement losses. Model users, however should apply whatever
rate is supportable for a given scenario.
MILUSBLCOEF, cell L675.
In MOSCOW, the campaign is fought in a user defined
rectangular zone. Inputs determine the terrain type mix
within the zone. The mix of terrain types is converted into
several factors representing the impact of terrain on
lethality, vulnerability, and mobility. One of these factors,
TERRMOVEMULT , is a factor (less than one) which reduces user
input for Red and Blue vehicle movement speeds. TERRMOVEMULT
also determines the fraction of the zone considered militarily
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usable terrain. Only military usable terrain is occupied,
attacked, or defended during the campaign.
The calibration coefficient MILUSBLCOEF determines the
degree to which TERRMOVEMULT reduces the amount of military
usable terrain area within the input campaign zone.
For example, the scenario may call for a zone of mixed
terrain types 100 Jem wide and 150 km deep. Total area within
the zone is 100 X 150 = 150,000 km2 . The mixed terrain inputs
determine a TERRMOVEMULT factor of say, .80. This implies
that combat vehicles travel only 80 percent of their input
advance rates. Only a portion of the total zone area is
usable by military forces. A value selected for the
calibration coefficient MILUSBLCOEF effectively reduces the
input zone width to some fraction of its original value of 100
km. This fraction is determined as follows:
%WIDTH-MILUSBL = (TERRM0VEMULT) MI LUSBLC0EF (3 0)
In MOSCOW, the actual portion of the campaign zone used by
military forces is:
(%WIDTH-MILUSBL)x(zone width)x(zone depth) = ZONE AREA OF MILITARY USE [km2 ] (31)
Therefore, the relationship between TERRMOVEMULT and
MILUSBLCOEF determines the fraction of the original campaign
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zone used by military forces. Figure 19 shows such a
relationship for all possible values of TERRMOVEMULT. As
TERRMOVEMULT increases the fraction of the original zone
available for military use also increases. A MILUSBLCOEF
value of one implies that the value for TERRMOVEMULT is also
the fraction of the original campaign zone which is of
military use. Smaller MILUSBLCOEF values imply a weaker
relationship and that zone usable fractions decrease more
slowly than TERRMOVEMULT. MILUSBLCOEF values greater than one
1
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Figure 19. The Fraction of the Campaign Zone that is of
Military Use is Determined by MILUSBLCOEF and
TERRMOVEMULT.
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imply a stronger relationship where zone usable fractions
reduce faster than TERRMOVEMULT . MILUSBLCOEF values greater
than two excessively reduce the usable portion of the campaign
zone. For example, if movement is reduced by half
(TERRM0VEMULT=.5) , a MILUSBLCOEF of 2 . 5 reduces the militarily
usable fraction of the entire zone to less than 20 percent.
MOSCOW models campaigns which are fought by units which
predominantly employ vehicle mounted weapons systems. A zone
which is reduced like the example should be occupied by some
form of unmechanized force and analyzed using a different
model. The recommended value range for MILUSBLCOEF is between
zero and two. Values in this range allow users to select the
desired relationship.
ATKTERMULTCOEF, cell L678.
MOSCOW requires the user to input the mix of terrain types
contained in the campaign zone. A terrain availability
multiplier ( TERRAVAILMULT) is one of several factors which
MOSCOW determines from terrain inputs. The terrain
availability multiplier (between zero and one) is the fraction
of the total force which is available as targets. The value
(1 - TERRAVAILMULT) represents the fraction of each force that
is not available as targets due to terrain.
The calibration coefficient ATKTERMULTCOEF is used to
account for the phenomenon that an attacking force, by virtue
of its aggressive mission, receives less protection from
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terrain than the defender. In MOSCOW, this phenomenon is
captured by reducing the fraction of the attacking force not
available as targets:
Fraction not available = (1 TERRAVAILMULT)
ATKTERMULTCOEF (32)
where ATKTERMULTCOEF is a value greater than or egual to one.
In MOSCOW, Lanchester lethality coefficients (enemy
kills/firer x minute) are reduced by the fraction of enemy
targets available. This represents the idea that a force can
only mass fires on available targets. The effect of the
calibration coefficient ATKTERMULTCOEF in MOSCOW is to
increase the fraction of the attacking force available as
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(1 - (1 - TERRAIN AVAIL MULT)} x Previous Lethality
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These equations show that the defender's lethality is
reduced by some smaller amount than the attacker. Figure 20
graphically illustrates the degree to which the equations
differ due to the calibration coefficient ATKTERMULTCOEF. In
the figure, the edge of the surface at a value of one for
ATKTERMULTCOEF is the edge where the attacker and defender
lethality are reduced by the same fraction. In other words,
terrain protection has the same effect on both forces.
Selecting values for ATKTERMULTCOEF greater than one means
that attacking forces receive less protection from terrain,
increasing their availability as targets, and subsequently
reducing defender lethality by a smaller amount than the
standard reduction.
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Figure 20. ATKTERRMULTCOEF Determines the Fraction of
Terrain Protection Lost by the Attacker, Increasing the
Fraction of Attacking Vehicles Avaialable as Targets.
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The recommended range from which to select values for
ATKTERMULTCOEF is between one and five. Values below one do
not make sense since they imply that terrain makes more
attacking targets available than exist in the attacking force.
The figure also shows that values greater than five
incorrectly imply that terrain affords almost no protection
to the attacker.
DISMTDVULNCOEF, cell L683.
MOSCOW allows users to input the fraction of Infantry
conducting dismounted operations in an average engagement.
The net effect is to increase force lethality due to the
increased number of firers at a cost of increasing firer
vulnerability. MOSCOW employs a homogeneous Lanchester
attrition module, so dismounted Infantry effects must be
represented indirectly. Lanchester lethality coefficients,
[enemy kills/firer x minute], apply to vehicle weapon systems.
The model tallies some fraction of a vehicle's crew as killed
when their vehicle is destroyed. Infantry dismounted from a
vehicle and subsequently killed are counted separately by
transforming the vehicle kill rate into a personnel kill rate
using the input ANTIPERSCOEF. This is the personnel kill rate
applied only to the portion of Infantry that is conducting
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x ANTIPERSCOEF x (%PERSDISMTD) Dlsv,TDVULNCOEF
Min
where %PERSDISMTD is the fraction of Infantry conducting
dismounted operations. The input value for ANTIPERSCOEF is
difficult to determine. This input is the number of
dismounted Infantry kills (given that all Infantry is
dismounted) that can be expected for every vehicle kill under
exposed conditions. The resulting personnel kill rate is then
adjusted by the relationship between %PERSDISMTD and the
calibration coefficient DISMTDVULNCOEF.
Figure 21 demonstrates the effect of this relationship on
the dismounted Infantry kill rate. A value of one for
DISMTDVULNCOEF implies that the "exposed condition" kill rate
is applied to dismounted Infantry. Increasing values for
DISMTDVULNCOEF imply less exposure and a smaller Infantry kill
AIt is interesting to note that as a result of MOSCOW'S
use of inputs which aggregate the characteristics of equipment
types, each MOSCOW "average" vehicle has the capability to
dismount Infantry so long as some dismountable Infantry exists
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Figure 21. DISMTDVULNCOEF Determines the Vulnerabilty of
Dismounted Infantry.
rate. For example, a coefficient of 2.5 applied to a
situation where half of all Infantry is dismounted implies
that Infantry casualties occur at less than one fifth of the
normal "exposed" rate. A reduction of this magnitude seems
excessive so the recommended upper limit is two. Model users
may represent some situations requiring larger values, but on
average, this is a significant reduction. This Note that
DISMTDVULNCOEF values less than one are feasible, but mean
that the fraction of Infantry dismounted are killed at a rate
exceeding that defined by the input ANTIPERSCOEF which
violates the intent of the process. The recommended range for
DISMTDVULNCOEF is between one and two.
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DISMTDLETHCOEF, cell L685, and IERRCOEFSURVTM , cell L690.
These two coefficients are used as examples in the main
body of this paper and are not repeated here. See Chapter II,
Section B, for an explanation of IERRCOEFSURVTM and Chapter
III, for an explanation of DISMTDLETHCOEF.
HOLOADDELCOEF, cell L692 , and HOBURDDELCOEF, cell L694.
Both of these calibration coefficients are used to
determine the time forces spend in the Delay activity. The
Delay activity represents wasted time subordinate units spend
"awaiting orders" rather than other combat activities. The
phenomenon represents the "friction of command" a delay
induced by headquarters elements which control several,
possibly too many, subordinate maneuver units. Military
headquarters elements are designed to control a certain
maximum number of subordinate units. As the number of
subordinate units increases, even within design limits,
headquarters elements take longer to coordinate and issue
orders for execution. The term "load" denoted by the
coefficient name, refers to this phenomenon. The term
"burden" refers to the idea that headquarters will take even
longer to coordinate subordinate activities when the number
of units it commands exceeds its design limit.
This maximum number is often referred to as a
headquarter ' s "span of control" which is a consideration in
the optimum design of force structure (number and types of
units) and the operational concept through which these forces
are used.
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MOSCOW users input the number of Blue forces available to
achieve desired success conditions. Among other values are
inputs which specify the number of available headquarters and
their design limit for command, or HQ-SPAN MVR. These values
determine headquarters load and burden. As headquarters load
and burden increase, time spent in the Delay activity
increases. Increased delay time results in the use of
additional Blue units. This compounds the load and burden
problem of controlling headquarters.
The equation used to determine the time spent in the delay
activity is:








where "Units Required" is the number of maneuver units
required to achieve success, HQ AVAIL is the number of
available headquarters, and HQ-SPAN MVR is the design limit
for the number of units a headquarters can adequately command.
The number of Blue (Units Required) is calculated as part of
model output.
The calibration coefficients used in the above equation
transform units-to-headquarters ratios and related design
limits to delay time. Figures 22 and 23 provide examples
demonstrating the effect of the two coefficients. In both
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Figure 22. Example of How HQLOADDELCOEF Affects Time of the
Delay Activity When HQBURDDELCOEF = 0.
HQ SPAN MVP, CDESIGN LIMIT} = 3 THIS EXAMPLE








Figure 23. Example of How HQLOADDELCOEF Affects Time of Delay
Activity When HQBURDDELCOEF = 1.
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examples, headquarters units are capable of adequately
commanding three subordinate units (HQ-SPAN MVR = 3) . Both
figures show the effect of varying MVR REQD/HQ ratios and
values for HQLOADDELCOEF. Comparing the two figures provides
insight about the effect of HQBURDDELCOEF. In Figure 2 2
HQBURDDELCOEF is set at zero which implies that headquarters
design limits have no effect on delay activity. This figure
shows only the effect of HQLOADDELCOEF. Figure 23 is the
alternate extreme case where HQBURDDELCOEF is set at one. In
this case headquarters design limits have their maximum effect
on delay activity time. Note that this case provides more
extreme values for delay activity time. Values above one for
HQBURDDELCOEF result in excessive delay periods when
headquarters exceed their design limits.
Recommended values for HQLOADDELCOEF range from zero to
0.25. For HQBURDDELCOEF the recommended range is from zero
to one. These ranges are recommended so that delay times for
current force structure headquarter ' s "span of control" (3-5)
and typical numbers of assigned units (1-5) seem reasonable.
The computed delay time is assessed against every unit between
every engagement. Although delay time is difficult to
quantify, it is reasonable to expect that some delay will
exist, but on average, not in excess of 2 . 5 days between each
engagement. Selecting calibration coefficient values within
the recommended range for current force structure standards
keeps delay time within these limits. Users are cautioned to
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carefully examine model output to establish that time spent
in the Delay activity is reasonable.
HOBURDCOEFC3ER cell, L696.
MOSCOW initially determines the number of Blue units
required to achieve campaign success while ignoring command,
control, and communications (C3) error. The model then
determines how many additional Blue units are required to
overcome inefficiency associated with the level of C3 error.
C3 error is a fractional level of command, control and
communications degradation.
The calibration coefficient HQBURDC0EFC3ER is used along
with headquarters burden to modify the level of C3 error
before it is used to determine additional Blue units.
Headquarters burden, described in detail in the section for
HQBURDDELCOEF, represents the effect of headquarters units
commanding some number of subordinate units above or below
their intended design limit. The modified level of C3 error
is established in the following equation.
Operational C3 Error = (C3 Error)x(HQ Burden) HQBURDC0EFC3ER (37)
HQ Burden is a value usually between 0.5 and 1.5,
depending upon the number of units it commands. Headquarters
which are commanding half as many units as they are designed
for produce a HQ Burden of 0.5. Headquarters that command
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twice as many units (highly unlikely) as they are designed for
produce a HQ Burden of two. MOSCOW computes HQ Burden as the
average burden for all headquarters in the campaign. Values
greater than one imply overburdened headquarters and increase
C3 error. Values less than one imply under burdened
headguarters and decrease C3 error. The degree of C3 error
modification by HQ Burden depends upon the value selected for
the calibration coefficient HQBURDC0EFC3ER. Figure 24 shows
how various calibration coefficient and HQ Burden combinations
combine to modify the original C3 error level. When
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Figure 24. HQBURDC0EFC3ER Determines How Headquarters
Burden Affects C3 Error.
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is not modified, regardless of the calibration coefficient
value. A value of zero for HQBURDC0EFC3ER means that C3 error
is not affected by headquarters burden. Larger calibration
coefficient values impart larger modifications to C3 error
when headquarters are under or overburdened.
The recommended range for HQBURDC0EFC3ER value selection
is from zero to two. Values above two for this coefficient
result in unreasonably high C3 error increases when
headquarters are overburdened. For example, a coefficient
value of three applied to headquarters burden of 1.3 more than
doubles C3 error. This is equivalent to a headquarters with
a rated span of three controlling one extra unit (four) at a
cost of doubling C3 error. This relationship is too strong
for most scenarios.
REDSURVDISCOEF, cell L7 01.
In MOSCOW the Disengage activity represents the time Blue
forces spend disengaging from combat and travelling some
"shadow" distance from the enemy. When a unit has complete
control over the disengagement, time spent in this activity
is the time it takes to travel the shadow distance at an
unimpeded movement rate. In most cases, neither side has
complete control over the disengagement and movement is
impeded by enemy survivors. The calibration coefficient
REDSURVDISCOEF modifies the amount by which Red survivors
increase unimpeded Blue attacker disengagement time. The
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Disengage activity time is determined by the following
equation:
/ Discnasement Distance \
Time to Disengage [Davs] = ry^
; g ; +fc fc L
'
J y Movement Rate /
1 ^ x (%REDSURVIVORS) ( '-™E**G™ °< DEF ) (38)
REDSURVDISCOEF
DISENG%-ATK or DEF is a value between zero and one
representing Blue force ability to control disengagement. The
user selects two values, one for each engagement type of
attack or defend. A value of one for this input indicates
that Blue has full control during disengagement. A value of
zero implies that Red controls disengagements. The equation
shows that the fraction of the original Red force remaining
also effects the time Blue takes to disengage. Note that when
Blue has total control over the disengagement, time to
disengage is effectively unimpeded travel time. Figure 25
shows how the calibration coefficient REDSURVDISCOEF scales
unimpeded travel time for Blue. The figure does not include
the impeded travel time, since it is a constant for any given
scenario. For purposes of the example, the figure uses a
value of 0.75 as the fraction of the Red force surviving the
engagement.
Increasing calibration coefficient values decrease the
ability of surviving Red forces to impede Blue disengagement.
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Figure 25. REDSURDISCOEF Determines How the Fraction of Red
Survivors and Blue Force's Ability to Control Disengagement
Add to the Time Blue Takes to Disengage.
The recommended REDSURVDISCOEF value range is between three
and fifteen. Values smaller than three produce unreasonably
high disengagement times for Blue. Values larger than fifteen
make Blue disengagement time insensitive to Red survivors,
even when Red controls disengagement. Model users are advised
to evaluate disengagement times after each run to ensure the
activity does not dominate other activities in the cycle.
RECONSTMCOEF . cell L7 03.
Units must assess casualties to personnel and equipment
and reorganize between engagements. MOSCOW models this
process by making units spend time in the Reconstitute
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activity. The primary variables MOSCOW uses to determine the
time spent in this activity are the fraction of the Blue force
which survives engagements and the amount of Blue force C3
error. After longer engagements the time to change from
battle formations to administrative postures is also added,
but not explained in this section. The idea is that more
casualties and higher C3 error rates both serve to increase
the time a force needs to reconstitute. The calibration
coefficient RECONSTMCOEF scales the following equation to a
reasonable time for the Reconstitute Activity.
Time to Reconstitutc[Days] =
RECONSTMCOEF (39)
(1 - C3 ERROR) x (%BLUE SURVIVORS in ATK or DEF)
The argument %Blue Survivors is a different value for attack
and defend engagements. This equation is plotted in Figure
26 for various levels of the numerator and denominator. The
combined term in the denominator should range between 0.4 and
0.9 for reasonable engagement attrition and C3 error levels.
The larger the value for RECONSTMCOEF, the longer the time
spent in the Reconstitute activity. Time is spent in this
activity between each engagement. Recommended values for
RECONSTMCOEF are between zero and 0.1. A value of zero
implies that the user does not want to model reconstitution
time for a given scenario. Values greater than 0.1 lead to
excessively large average reconstitution activity times.
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Figure 26. RECONSTMCOEF Determines How C3 Error and the
Fraction of Blue Survivors Combine to Determine Time to
Reconstitute Blue Forces.
LOWRESTCOEF, cell L7 08.
Lack of rest degrades the effectiveness of forces in
combat. In MOSCOW, users select a value, BASELINE%REST, which
represents the fraction of a day soldiers must rest to
maintain full effectiveness. Model users also select a value,
%REST, which represents the fraction of a day soldiers
actually rest during the modelled campaign. When %REST equals
or exceeds BASELINE%REST, force effectiveness is not degraded.
If %REST is below BASELINE%REST, soldiers fail to get adequate
rest and effectiveness decreases. Two Blue force attributes
are degraded by lack of rest: movement rate and Lanchester
lethality kill rates. The degree to which lack of rest
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degrades these attributes depends upon the value selected for
the calibration coefficient LOWRESTCOEF. The equations
modifying these attributes are as follows:
Blue Movement Rater_KM_i =
Hour
.













The term degrading the full rest rates is plotted in Figure
27. As expected, a unit's effectiveness decreases as rest
decreases below the baseline threshold. A LOWRESTCOEF of zero
implies that lack of rest effects are not modelled. As the
value for LOWRESTCOEF increases, lack of rest effects become
more severe. The recommended range of values for this
coefficient is between zero and five. Values larger than five
excessively degrade both movement and lethality.
CALIBRATION COEFFICIENT, cell L711.
This calibration coefficient value is input in spreadsheet
cell L711, but has no established name. The value selected
for this calibration coefficient determines the degree that





CBASELINE % REST [L621J3
Figure 27. LOWRESTCOEF Determines How Much Blue Lethality
is Degraded by Lack of Rest.
activities requiring no movement or combat. MOSCOW
establishes a distribution of activity times Blue forces spend
between each engagement event. MOSCOW determines the fraction
of a ~otal cycle of these activities that Blue spends not
moving or in combat and places this value in a variable named
BLUE%NON-M/C. This is the fraction of a cycle between
engagements Blue spends in non-moving activities. MOSCOW does
not compute a corresponding fraction of total time not moving
for Red forces. The user input RED%NON-M/C establishes the
corresponding fraction of the total time Red spends in
activities not involving advance or combat. The ratio
(RED%N0N-M/C / BLUE%NON-M/C) establishes a relative amount of
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nonmovement activity between Red and Blue forces. When Red
forces move more than Blue forces, this ratio is less than
one.
Red C3 error reduces both the Red force movement rate and
Lanchester lethality kill rates. MOSCOW allows Red C3 error
to be reduced when Red forces move more than Blue forces.
The idea is that the more Red out-maneuvers Blue, the more
Red can overcome the degradation effects of C3 error on
movement rate and lethality.
Red C3 error is reduced by the following equation:
RED C3 ERROR (%) =
RED%NON-M/C \ L7n
Previous RED C3 ERROR x ( -
,
,
.„ rrr— ) (42)
o L
L
h / o .nU.n- .VI , \^
Red C3 error is only modified when the nonmovement ratio
is less than one; in other words, when Red moves more than
Blue. The value selected for calibration coefficient L711
determines the degree to which relative Red movement reduces
Red C3 error. The amounts of reduction for various movement
ratios and L711 values are plotted in Figure 28.
In this graph, the movement ratio axis ranges from 0.2 to
one. This corresponds to Red movement from almost double that
of Blue to the same amount. When Red moves the same amount
as Blue, no adjustment is made to C3 error. As Red forces
move more than Blue, Red C3 error decreases. The amount of
C3 error reduction increases as the calibration coefficient
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CALIBRATION COEFFICIENT [1.711] BLUE%NON-M/C
Figure 28. Coefficient L711 Determines How Red-to-Blue
Relative Movement Affects Red C3 Error.
L711 increases. Note that a value of zero for L711 implies
that the model user assumes that Red forces may not reduce C3
error by movement.
The recommended range for calibration coefficient L711 is
between zero and two. Values larger than two excessively
reduce Red C3 error.
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APPENDIX C
CODE CORRECTIONS CONTAINED IN MOSCOW-NPS
A. Code Changes Affecting Calibration Coefficient Use.
INPUT CONVERSIONS MODULE:
T390: [W9]
( ( (1-$K$3 08) *(AA71*AK3 05+AA7 6*AK3 07) )+( (1-$K$3 09) *( (1-
AA71) *AK305+(1-AA76) *AK307) ) ) *$L$391*$L$392*$L$393*$TE
RRTGTAVLMULT*(1/$TERRDEFMULT) *@MAX ( $AA$255^ ($PWRRCOEFC
ASKIL*$Q$657) ,1)
T400: (Fl) [W9]
( (1-$K$3 08) *$K$2 5 3+(1-$K$3 09) *$S$241) * ( $L$4 01- (S4 03/T3
98)-(S437/T398) ) *$L$402*$L$4 03*$K$253*$TERRTGTAVLMULT*




( (1-K308) *K253+(1-K309) *S241) *L4 2 1*L4 2 6*L4 27*TERRTGTAV
LMULT*(1/TERRDEFMULT) *@MAX(AA255 A (PWRRCOEFAIKILS*Q660)
T427: [W9]
+ L4 21*L4 33*L4 34*L4 35 *TERRTGTAVLMULT* ( 1/TERRDEFMULT ) * @M
AX(AA255 A (PWRRCOEFAIDEL*Q663) , 1)
T432: (F3) [W9]
( (1-K308) *K253+(1-K309) *S241) *L4 21*L4 41*TERRTGTAVLMULT










ERROR*§MIN( (l-$AA$2 55 A ($PWRCOEFIERR-ATK*Q654) ) ,1) ,0.00
1)
AA259: [W8]




ERROR*@MIN( (1-AB263 A (PWRCOEFIERR-DEF*$Q655) ) ,1) ,0.001)
AA1023: (F5) [W8]
§MIN( ($S$407*$CAMPAIGN LGTH/$AL$3 07 ) / ($HRS/DAY
USBLE*60*$AO$2 54) , L623* (AA102 0+AA1021)
)
AA702: (F5) [W8]
§MIN( ($S$408*$CAMPAIGN LGTH/$AL$305) / ($HRS/DAY
USBLE*60*$AO$210) , L623* (AA699+AA700)
)
AA106: [W8]





@IF(AB104>1, ( (1-AB102)*Q651*( (1-AA104) "$PWRRCOEFTGTAVL
) )+AB102,AB102)
AA265: [W8]
@IF(AA263>1, ( (1-AA261) *Q651* ( (1-AB263) A $PWRRCOEFTGTAVL
) )+AA261,AA261)
AB265: [W8]
@IF(AB263>1, ( (1-AB261)*Q651*( ( 1-AA2 63 A $PWRRCOEFTGTAVL
) )+AB261,AB261)
AA466: [W8]









+AA672* (1+$AA$682) A ( $DISMTDLETHC0EF*Q686) *AA692*AB693
AB684: [W8]
+AB672*(1+AB682) A (DISMTDLETHCOEF*Q686) *AB692*AA693
AA687: [W8]
+AA675*(1+$AA$682) A ( $DISMTDLETHCOEF*Q686) *AA692*AB693
AB687: [W8]
+AB675* (1+AB682) A (DISMTDLETHCOEF*Q686) *AB692*AA693
AA690: [W8]
+AA678* (1+$AA$682) A ( $DISMTDLETHCOEF*Q686) *AA692*AB693
AB690: [W8]
+AB678* (1+AB682) A ( DISMTDLETHCOEF*Q686) *AB692*AA693
AA1005: [W8]
+AA993* (1+$AA$682) A ( $DISMTDLETHCOEF*Q686) *AA1013*AB1014
AB1005: [W8]
+AB993* (1+AB682) A (DISMTDLETHCOEF*Q686) *AB1013 *AA1014
AA1008: [W8]
+AA996* (1+$AA$682) A ( $DISMTDLETHCOEF*Q686) *AA1013*AB1014
AB1008: [W8]
+AB996* (1+AB682) A ( DISMTDLETHC0EF*Q686) *AB1013*AA1014
AA1011: [W8]
+AA999*(1+$AA$682) A ( $DISMTDLETHCOEF*Q686) *AA1013 *AB1014
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AB1011: [W8]













(1-DISENG%AGE-ATK) ) ) ) *$K$510* ( $CYC/MVRATK-1) /$CYC/MVRA
TK
AU110: (F3) [W9]
( ( $SHADOWDIS-DEF/$BLUEMOVEF) + ( $Q$701* ( l/$REDSURVDISCOE
F)*@ABS($AN$2 62) A ( 1/ ( 1-$DISENG
%AGE-DEF) ) ) ) *$K$510* ( $CYC/MVRDEF-1) /$CYC/MVRDEF
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B. Code Changes Affecting Battle Termination and Attrition
INPUTS MODULE:
1241: [W7] 'RED ATTR-RATK
K241: [W8] 0.2
L241: [W8] 0.3
M241: [W9] ' %desired/engagement
124 2: [W7] 'BLUE ATTR-BLATK
K242: [W8] 0.25
L242: [W8] 0.15
















[Wll] 'Attrit Pref-Blu Atk
[W7] 'Attrit Pref-Red Atk
[W9] 'Blu Prefe










[W9] 'Blu Preference on:
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AI72: [Wll] 'rence on:
AJ72: [W4] 'Red
AH73: [W9] 'Red Prefe
AI73: [Wll] 'rence on:
AJ73: [W4] 'Red
AI415: [Wll] '"Break Point" Attrition Values
AI416: [Wll] ' (considers abil to diseng)
AI417: [Wll] 'Blue Attack
AM417: [W7] '
AH418: [W9] 'Red Attrit-Blu Atk
AK418: (PO) U [W9]
@IF(Q550=0,@MAX(AK7 3+(AK64*(AK7 2-AK7 3) ) ,0.001) , @MIN(@M
AX(AK7
3+(AK64*(AK72-AK73) ) ,0.001) ,AK72)
)
AM418: [W7] '
AH419: [W9] 'Blue Attrit-Blu Atk
AK419: (P0) U [W9]
@IF(Q550=0,@MAX(AK7 0+( ( 1-AK64 ) * (AK71-AK70) ) ,0.001) , @MI
N(@MAX(AK70+( ( 1-AK64 ) * (AK71-AK70) ) ,0.001) ,AK71)
)
AL419: [W12] +AL211*AM214 A K611* ( 1-AK419)
AI421: [Wll] 'Blue Defense
AH422: [W9] 'Red Attrit-Blu Def
AK422: (P0) U [W9]
@IF(Q500=0,@MAX(AN7 0+( ( 1-AK65) * (AN71-AN7 0) ) ,0.001) , §MI
N(@MAX(AN70+( ( 1-AK65) * (AN71-AN70) ) ,0.001) ,AN70)
AH423: [W9] 'Blue Attrit-Blu Def
AK423: (P0) U [W9]
@IF(Q550=0,@MAX(AN7 3+(AK65*(AN72-AN7 3) ) ,0.001) , @MIN ( @M
AX(AN73+(AK65*(AN72-AN73) ) ,0.001) ,AN73)
)
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ATTACK ONE ACTIVITY CHANGES:
AH200: [W9] +AK204-AL204
AI200: (F2) [Wll]
( ($AJ$204-@ABS($AK$204-$AL$204) A $K$611) / ( $AM$204-$AN$204 )
)
AJ200: (Fl) [W4] +AK205-AL205
AK200: (F2) [W9]
( ($AJ$205-@ABS($AK$205-$AL$205) A $K$611)/($AM$205-$AN$205)
AI201: [Wll] 'ATK1 ACTIVITY
AL201: [W12] ' TATK1BBP:
AN201: (F2) [W9]
@IF(RTARG1B<0, 10000, @IF(LNARG1B<1, 10000 , RAWBBP1)
)
AO201: [Wll] 'hrs
AL2 02: [W12] 'km TATK1RBP:
AN202: (F2) [W9]
@IF(RTARG1R<0, 10000, @IF(LNARG1R<1, 10000, RAWRBP1)
AO202: [Wll] 'hrs Days
AL2 03: [W12] ' km/hr TATK1ACT:
AN203: [W9]
@MAX(@MIN($AN$2 00,$AN$2 01,$AN$2 02) ,0.000001)
AO203: (F3) [Wll]
@MAX(AN2 3/(HRS/DAY USBLE*L613) ,0.00049)
AH204: (F2) [W9]
@LN( ($AJ$204-@ABS($AK$204-$AL$204) A $K$611) / ($AM$204-$A
N$204) )/$AO$204
AI204: (F2) [Wll]
@LN( ($AJ$205-@ABS($AK$205-$AL$205) A $K$611) / ( $AM$205-$A
N$205) )/($AO$205)
AJ204: (Fl) [W4] +AM214 A K611* ( 1-AK419) *AL211
AK204: [W9] +AM213*(AL210) A L609
AL204: [W12] ( 1- ( 1-AK419) A L609) * (AM214*AL211 A L609)
AM204: [W7] +AM214 A K611* (AL211)
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AN204: [W9] +AM213 A K611*AL210
AO204: [Wll] +AO205








( ($AJ$249-@ABS($AK$249-$AL$249) A $K$611)/ ( $AM$249-$AN$2
49) )/($AO$249)
AJ246: (FO) [W4] +AK248-AL248
AK246: [W9]
( ($AJ$248-@ABS($AK$248-$AL$248) A $K$611)/($AM$248-$AN$2
48) )/($AO$248)
AM246: [W7] • TRBP
AN246: (F2) [W9]
@IF (RTARGDR<0 , 10000 , §IF (LNARGDR<1 , 10000 , RAWRBPD)
A0246: [Wll] Days
AK247: [W9]
@LN( ($AJ$248-@ABS($AK$248-$AL$248) A $K$611) / ( $AM$248-$A
N$248) )/($A0$248)
AL247: [W12]






@MAX(AN24 7/(HRS/DAY USBLE*L613) ,0.00049)
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AH248: [W9]




@LN( ($AJ$248-@ABS($AK$248-$AL$248) A $K$611)/($AM$248-$A
N$248) )/($AO$248)
AJ248: (Fl) [W4]
+$AM$2 57 A K611*(1-$AK$423)*$AL$2 54
AK248: [W9]
+$AM$2 58*$AL$2 55 A L609
AL248: (Fl) [W12]
(1-(1-$AK$423) A L609) * ( $AM$257*$AL$254 A L609
)
AM248: [W7] +$AM$257 A K611*$AL$254
AN248: [W9] +$AM$258 AK611*$AL$255





BASE CASE MODEL INPUTS FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
TERRAIN FEATURES IN ZONE (2 Screens)



























































































































H i I I s/Mtns
Flat/Rolling
Hi I I s / M t n s
Flat/Rolling


























RED THREAT AND SCENARIO (ZONE GEOGRAPHY AND FORCE SIZE)
ZONE WIDTH 750 km
ZONE LENGTH 300 km
#CHOKE AREAS 0.00
CHOKEAR FRONTG 0.00
CHOKE AR DEPTH 0.00
HRS/DAY USBLE 24.0
BLUE WARN I NG 2.00
it areas where traffic is confined
Average choke area width (km)
Average choke area depth (km)
hrs/day usable for operations
days
# RED MVR 30 .
#FRNTLNDIVS 24.0
#REDHQs 7.0
« RED ENG UNITS 7.0
# Red maneuver units (rmvrs)
# rmvrs in front line
# Red Headquarters (HQs)
# Red engineer units
% RMVRS - ATK 0.75
RED D I V SEPRTN 25.0
RMVR AGGRSV- ATK 0.80
RMVR AGGRSV-DEF -0.05
% rmvrs assigned atk mission
Average distance between rmvrs (km)
Dist toward enemy/total dist moved
Dist toward enemy/total dist moved
( + 1.0 = forw; - 1 . = a w a y ; = static)
BLUE SUCCESS CRITERIA AND ZONE-LEVEL POLICY (2 screens)
SUCCESS CRITERIA (automatically met by MOSCOW)
RED PEN LIMIT
RED SURV I VORS
MAXPEN PRE - I NT
60 km Red allowed to penetrate zone
8.0 # rmvrs allowed to survive
10.0 km max pen before must eng Red
TIME OBJECTIVE (criterion for evaluating performance of concept)
DELAY 3.0 campaign-days added by Blue operns





%of ZONEW DE FD
0.0 km to border
30 km to border
0.50 % Blue atks using linear operations




0.50 Dist toward enemy/total dist moved
-0.20 Dist toward enemy/total dist moved
( + 1 . = f o r w ; -1.0 = away; = static)
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HVR MISSION ASSI GNHENTS
%MVRs - ATK K I LS
%MVRs-DE F K I LS
0.20 % rmvrs to be killed by atk mvrs
0.80 % rmvrs to be killed by def mvrs





# ENG UNI TS AVAI L
8.0 # Blue HQs in zone
5.0 # mvrs controllable by Blue HQs
75.0 Max dist an HQ can control an mvr
10.0 # Blue engineer units in zone








MAXIMUM TOTAL CASUALTY 250000








AMMO ( TONS ) 7 . 0E + 05
POL (TONS) 5 . 0E + 06
OTHER ( TONS ) 1 . 0E + 05












AMMO ( TONS )
POL ( TONS )
OTHER ( TONS )
LIFT ( TONS )
4000 .
400.0
. OE + 04
.OE+05
.OE+03









SUPPLY VEHICLES 100000 # vehicles
TOLERANCE LEVEL 110% Requi red/avai lable
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MANEUVER UNIT DESCRIPTION AND OPERATIONAL POLICY (7 screens)
Red Blue
SIZE OF MANEUVER UNIT (MVR)
TECH/ORG




D I SENG XAGE -DE F NA
% NON -MV/CBT . 66
0.50 X of engagement
0.50 X of engagement
NA Xtime not moving or fighting
POL ICY & NORMS
TAC PUR -ATK 1.25




MOB I L I T
Y
TECH/ORG
MVMT / HR -ADM IN 12.0
MVMT/HR-BATTL 5.0
VE H DASH SPD 65.8
VEH BRKDWNS . 060
POL CONS/KM NA
TIME-CHNG FORM 20.0
1.25 Ratio: Attack to defend combat power
0.28 Xdesi red/engagement







NA % vehicles that breakdown per day
0.8 gals/km
20 minutes to change formation type
POLICY & NORMS
%MVMT-ADM FORM 0.33
TAC STA PD - ATK 0.75
TAC STA PD -DE F 4.00
D 1 S/TAC MV- ATK 450.0
DIS/TAC MV-DEF 200 . 00
IF %OPNL MOVE 0.80
LETHALITY
0.33 % of mvmt time in adm. formation
1.75 minutes stationary when attacking
1.80 minutes stationary when defending
175.0 meters moved per dash in attack
80.0 meters moved per dash on defense
0.80 IF a gg r es
i





MAX I F RATE -M 5.0
MAXDFRATE-S 3.7
MAXDFRATE-M 2.4
I F RANGE -MAX 27.00
IF RANGE-MIN 0.50
D F RANGE - MAX 4.00






0.25 % veh able to fire in adm. formation
0.70 % veh able to fire in btl. formation
5.00 max rnds/min of IF while stationary
5.00 max rnds/min of IF while moving
3.40 max rnds/min of DF while stationary
2.08 max rnds/min of DF while moving

















































ST - F L
ST - FL
ST - F L
ERS D






















OT - H I
OT - LO
















































0.47 P(hft/rnd): sta DF, mov tgt Sim in rng
0.29 P(hit/rnd): mov DF, sta tgt amin rng
0.19 P(hit/rnd): mov DF, mov tgt amin rng
0.62 Degradation of P(hit/rnd) at max rng
0.47 Prob. of vehicle kill given hit
0.30 Pr. dismtd infy kill given veh kill
0.33 Degradation of P(hit/rnd) for IF
1.50 actual IF rnds/min while stationary
1.50 actual IF rnds/min while moving
0.92 actual DF rnds/min while stationary
0.23 actual DF rnds/min while moving






1 . 76 km
0.10 km
0.80 % veh firing in DF mode
0.23 % personnel acting as dismtd infy
0.01 max dis betw veh as % of avg range
21.00 km
1.00 x Friendly lethality
1.00 x Friendly lethality
NA % of atk veh in 1st ech
TECH/ORG
HARDNESS - FRONT 1.00
HARDNESS-SIDE 1.00
CONCLMT -ADMIN 0.16
CONCLMT - BATTL 0.35
MAX ATTR/DAY 1.00
BREAKPOI NT 1.00
POL ICY & NORMS
SHADOW D I S - ATK NA
SHADOW D I S-DEF NA
DEFENSE PREP% NA
VEHDIS-ATK 50.0
Ml SC VULN MU- A 1.00
M I SC VULN MU-D 1.00
C3I EW
1.00 x hardness assumed in enemy P(kill)
1.00 x hardness assumed in enemy P(kill)
0.15 % veh concealed from enemy
0.35 % veh concealed from enemy
1.00 % pers attr/day before unit breaks
1.00 % pers cum attr before unit breaks
8.00 km
5.00 km
0.50 % of max preparations
50.0 min dist betw veh--m
1.00 x Enemy lethality
1.00 x Enemy lethality
TECH/ORG
ACQ T IME
- S TGT 180.0
STGT#SHOTS- ACQ 1.50
C-3 ERROR . 05
C-3 REGEN/DAY 0.01
MAX C-3 ERR 0.40
INTEL ERROR . 03
180.0 sees, reqd to acquire stationary tgt
1.50 # of tgt's shots reqd to acq sta tgt
0.05 min % errors in C-3 system
0.02 daily reduc. in C-3 error from regen
0.20 max % errors in C-3 system
0.03 min % errors in Intel system
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EW EFFNESS 1.75 1.50 x Blue/red C-3 err due to EU
ATK PREP&RECOV 10.00 N A Prep&recov time as mult of atk time
DEF PREP&RECOV 4.00 NA Prep&recov time as mult of def time














% R E P L / A
%REPL/D
D I S - EXC
D I S- EXC
% REST























































7.14 passengers and crew per veh
33 rounds per veh
500 gals POL per veh
200 lbs. other resources per veh





/ga I I on
200 # non cbt casualties recoverable/day
20 # veh losses recoverable/day
0.33 Cbt cas recov per non cbt cas recov
0.30 % veh losses repl. by next atk engmt
0.30 % veh losses repl. by next def engmt
3.00 km from def engmt to supply exch.
20.0 km from atk engmt to supply exch.
0.25 % of time spent resting
0.08 % of losses repairable by mvr
0.50 % of losses repairable by theater
0.20 % of reprbl losses reprd by mvr
14000 tons supplies loaded/hr
150 km/day that a supply veh can move
5.0 tons capacity per supply veh
0.001 tons cap degrdn per km total dist
Pt
Pt
FIRE, AIR AND ENGINEER SUPPORT ALLOCATION (5 screens)
Red B I ue
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (PLANES AND HELOS)
TECH/ORG
STARTING CAS 684





688 initial CAS aircraft
2.50 sorties/day
0.04 Attrition rate per sortie
8.00 tons ordnance per sortie
0.30 # vehicles hit per ton of ordnance
0.90 Prob. vehicle killed given hit
PERCENTAGE AL LOCAT I ON
ATTK 0.10 30 % of aircraft supporting atk mvrs








4E+03 3.6E+03 tons ammo fired per day per HQ
0.20 0.20 veh hits per ton ammo fired
0.50 0.50 Prob. vehicle killed given hit





0.10 % of HQs supporting attk mvrs
0.30 %of HQs in counterf ire against HQs




NA 0.50 Rmvr-days delay/Blue engn r - un i t - day
0.30 NA Rmvr-days accel/Red engnr-un it-day
AIR INTERDICTION
TECH/ORG
INITIAL A I 569
SORT I ES/DAY 1 . 50
AIR ATTRITION 0.15
TONS ORD/S 6. 00
569.50 initial AI aircraft
2.00 sorties/day
0.10 Attrition rate per sortie







0.40 0.75 # vehicles hit per ton of ordnance






0.25 0.50 target hits/ton of ordnance
0.45 0.50 Prob. target killed given hit





C3 ERR/TON 0.002 0.005 Incr. in mvr C3 error/ton ordnance
A I COUNTER HQ MISSION
TECH/ORG
TONS SUPPD/T 0.75 0.75 tons enemy HQ fire suppressed/ton
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A I SUPPLY MISSION
TECH/ORG
S VEH HI TS/TON 2 . 00




VEH RE I N F K/H NA
NA Supply veh hits per ton ordnance
NA Prob. supply veh killed given hit
4.00 Reinforcement veh hits/ton ordnance
0.80 Prob. reinf vehicle killed given hit
POLICY AND NORMS: PERCENTAGE ALLOCATION






0.05 0.20 X AI sorties assnd attrition mission
0.10 0.10 X AI sorties assigned delay mission
0.40 0.50 X AI sorties assigned disrpt mission
0.45 0.20 X AI sorties assnd counterHQ mission
(remainder assigned supply mission)
RESOURCE CONSUMPTION COEFFICIENTS
ACT VT Y % C r i t pa %Un i t - t m Veh Pers Ammo POL Other
PRE 1 . 00 1 . 00 .020 0.30 0.33 .,50 25 . . PRE
S&R 1 . 00 1 . 00 0.040 0.40 0.75 0.,75 25 ,.0 S&R
DEL 1 . 00 1 .00 0.010 . 20 0.33 .,50 25 ,.0 DEL
MUR 1 . 00 1 . 00 . 060 .30 1 . 00 1 . , 00 25 . MWR
ATK 1 1 . 00 1 .00 . 080 .60 1 .00 1 .,00 25 .0 ATK1
ATK2 1 . 00 1 . 00 . 080 . 60 1 . 00 1 . , 00 25 . ATK2
DE F 1 . 00 1 . 00 . 080 0.60 1 . 00 1 . , 00 25 .0 DE F
D I S 1 . CO 1 . 00 . 040 0.40 1 . 00 1 , 00 25 . D 1 S
RCL 1 . 00 1 . 00 0.040 . 40 1 .00 1 . , 00 25 .0 RCL
RCST 1 . 00 1 . 00 . 030 0.10 1 . 00 . 50 25 .0 RCST
MTX 1 . 00 1
.
00 . 020 0.15 . 75 , 85 25 . MTX
LOD . 00 1 . 00 . 005 . 07 .33 ,.50 25 . LOD
RPR .33 1 . 00 . 005 . 07 0.33 ,.50 25 . RPR
RES 1 . 00 1 , . 00 . 005 0.07 .33 ,.50 25 .0 RES
MTS 1 . 00 1 . 00 0.040 0.15 . 75 ,.85 25 .0 MTS
MXC 1 . 00 1 , . 00 0.040 0.15 . 75 . 85 25 .0 MXC
UN L 1 . 00 1 . . 00 0. 005 0.07 0.33 . 50 25,.0 UN L
Units Xo f a %m v r % veh s /
d
%pe r s /
v
%ammo/ v Xac t Iimv) lbs 01th/
pers/day
PRE
CONSTRAINTS ON BLUE AND RED UNIT ACTIVITIES
ACTIVITIES IN CYCLE SPECIAL CONSTRAINTS:
Prepare defenses
S&R Survey and reconnoiter
DEL Delay for higher echelon orders
MWR Move to weapon range (1st contact
ATK1 Attack--1st phase (1 Red unit)
ATK2 Attack--2nd phase (reinf. Red)
M I
N
NUMBER OF BLUE MVRs
MAX CUM CASUALTIES (%)
MAX CBT PUR RATIO:R ATK
MAX CBT PWR RAT I O: B ATK
MAX PEAK CASUALTIES/DAY 0.00%




































































































u p p I i e s







































ATKRS CHOOSE ENGMT BRKOFF
If special constraints
are set to zero, they will not
affect other equations. If set
to a number, that value will be
used. For the three "max" con-
straints, setting them to a
very large value will cause
other, more binding constraints





































t a I Cycle
Unconstrained


















C o n s t r a i i ed Unconstrained




. 00 0. 04
. 00 . 00










. 00 . 00
. 00 1 . 84
T i me i n days
Constrained Unconstrained
0,. 00 1 . 04
. 00 . 02
.00 . 02
.00 . 00




, . 00 . 00
,.00 . 02
0,.00 . 04
0. , 00 .04
0. , 00 0.32
0..00 0. 55
0. , 00 . 03
0.,00 . 00
. , 00 . 00
0.,00 2.21
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{A I t + K> CALIBRATION COEFFICIENTS
MANDATORY CALIBRATION COEFFICIENTS
VALUE
( " X " )
Engagement Phenomena
EXPONENT OF NUMERICAL 2.00
STRENGTH IN LANCHESTER EQN.
(Note : 1 /X = 0.50)
ENGAGEMENT TEMPO 1.00
MULTIPLIER
(Note: If X < 1, engagements slow down.)
M V R Capabilities
HOURS/DEFENSE PREP. % 0.50
BASELINE%REST 0.25
MAXIMUM FIRE SUPPORT: 1.00
X * MVR ORGAN IC LETHALITY
Frontage of Attacking MVRs
X OF RED VEHICLES IN 0.30 Red
LEAD OF AT TK FORMAT I ON
7. OF BLUE VEHICLES IN 0.30 Blue
LEAD OF AT TK FORMATION
Rear Area Security Planning Factors












frontage; Max TAC FR
Attacking MVRs 1
frontage; Max TAC FR
RMVRs withheld for SEC
PERSONNE L / KM*2
REQUIRED FOR SECUR I TY
0.01 Blue Blue SEC MVRs required
OPTIONAL CALIBRATION COEFFICIENTS
COE F F I C I ENT
VARIABLE






("X") AFFECTED AFFECTED No=0
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Concentration and Dispersion Effects
TACPWRR A X 9.00 Availability
(as a target)
TAC PWR R A X ATK Case
DE F Case
TAC PWR R A X
TAC PWR R " X
TAC PWR R A X
TAC PWR R A X
EXCESS DEFENSE
FRONTAGE * X







0.5 A I Delay
0.5 AI Disruption
1.5 Terrain Defense




TERR MVMT MULT * X
1 - ( ( 1 - TERRA I N AVA I L
MULT I PL I ER ) / X
)





%PERS DISMTD A X 1.0 Personnel Hits
%PERS DISMTD A X
C-3I Effects
(1 + INTEL ERR) A X
(MVRs/HQ) * X






0.5 Time (DEL )
1.0 Operational




(as a target) 1
Vehicles killed 1
per CAS sortie
Veh ides killed 1
per AI sortie




# of RMVRs to be 1








Total cycle time 1
Total cycle time 1




C ( 1 / < 1 - X R E D S U R V ) ) A ( 1 / 8.00 Time (DIS)
D I SENGAGEX)) * ( 1 /X
)
(X/(%BLUE SURV * (1-C3 0.5 Time (RCST)
ERROR ) )*T I ME - FORMN CHANGE)
Total cycle time 1
Total cycle time 1
Campaign Intensity Effects
(%REST ACTUAL/BASELINE 1.00 Blue Lethality,
% R E S T ) A X Mobility
Blue Lethality,
Mobility
(((RED %N0N -MOVE/CBT ) / 1.00 RED C-3 Error
BLUE XNON-M/C) ) A X
Red Mobility
and Lethality
SEED VALUES FOR STARTING MODEL ITERATIONS
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